Syria: Western backers at an important crossroads

After almost seven years of gruesome warfare and hundreds of thousands of casualties it would seem like the Syrian conflict is entering a new phase. The Assad-regime has succeeded in re-establishing control in large swathes of the country thanks to the support of its allies. The rhetoric and the calculated political moves the regime continues to make are worrying since it shows that there will be almost no room for a lasting political solution that involves the other factions. 

The rebels are too fractured

The Syrian population initially took to the streets against the Assad-regime with the hope that it would implement a number of reforms. The Syrian people had enough of the authoritarian government that mainly looked after a privileged elite while using a large security apparatus to stamp out any form of dissent. When the protests turned violent, civilians began to organize themselves in militias to protect their homes, neighbourhoods and villages against raiding parties of Assadists who came to intimidate protesters. They mostly  consisted of paramilitary loyalists who sensed an opportunity to loot people’s homes without repercussions. As the resistance against the Assad-regime began to consolidate these groups became more organized thanks to a lot of soldiers that defected in large numbers.

The fragile cooperation and the ideological divide between the different rebel groups became apparent when the numerous groups began to pursue their own agendas to draw more support from their foreign backers and begin to bicker among themselves to carve up territory that they would begin to govern as they seemed fit. Matters were made worse with the emergence of several jihadist groups that saw an opportunity to gain support and influence in the region by fighting an enemy everyone wanted gone. The momentum these groups had on the battlefield at one point was lost because of this lack of cohesion.

The lack of coordination, gains and the enormous amount of money that was poured into these groups for tactical training and weapons through their foreign backers led to the decision that these programs would be either scaled down or shut down completely. The U.S. was one of these backers, and now numerous moderate rebels are at risk of being dissolved or absorbed by radical groups. The de-escalation zones that were implemented across Syria emphasize the critical situation in which the rebels find themselves, as the lack of cohesion between the groups leads to infighting and a waste of resources that could be used against their common enemy.

When the Assad-regime will focus its resources on these fronts it is unlikely that these groups will be able to mount a coordinated and an effective defence against the now military superior Assad forces. There will be also little to no political intervention on their behalf by the international community because of their radical beliefs.

The Assad-coalition has the upper-hand

The Assad coalition has succeeded in gaining the upper-hand both militarily and politically in the Syrian conflict, in no small part thanks to the contributions of its allies, of which Iran and Russia both played a crucial role. This allows them to focus their resources on a specific front, targeting certain groups in particular and gain another strategic or political advantage over the other factions. It gives them more leverage during the negotiations that aim to end the fighting and find a political solution.

At the start of the conflict the regime found itself in increasingly more trouble as it began to lose more and more control of the country. It only seemed a matter of time before the regime would fall as the loyalists were unable to mount successful offensives with the limited resources they had across the country. The regime was forced to concentrate its resources in a few elite units that would rush to the most critical fronts while a defensive posture was implemented across other fronts. Assad loyalists began to dig in and fortify their military bases and neighbourhoods while the air force began to systematically destroy rebel-held territory with a variety of ordnance. Barrel bombs, thermobaric ordnance and even chemical weapons were used on a large scale, mostly against its civilian population. This in turn resulted in a regional and international refugee crisis as millions were forced to flee the country. During all this the Assad-regime continued to claim that it was in control of most of the country.

The support the regime received was at first not enough to turn the tide in their favour as the rebels received increasingly more (in)direct support from their foreign backers. Turkey, the United States, Israel  and several gulf states in particular realised that the removal of the Assad regime could be a very good thing. The increasing amount of Iranian troops and Russian hardware however allowed the Assad-regime to mount its first series of offensives in the western part of Syria, taking control of the Khanassar-route and reaching its beleaguered forces in Syria’s largest city of Aleppo. The Assad-regime also began to push back against the rebel forces around the capital of Damascus and Daraa, more to the south. Large scale counteroffensives mounted by rebel forces were blocked and ultimately defeated.

The regime also succeeds in conquering more territory as it negotiates the surrender of rebel pockets across Syria, offering them amnesty or the opportunity to relocate with their families to rebel-held territory. These negotiations are undertaken by the reconciliation centre under the supervision of the regime’s Russian allies. This allows the regime to divert more troops to other fronts, avoid casualties while consolidating the rebels in certain parts of the country.

Both Iran and Russia have a lot to gain if the Assad-regime were to be victorious. Iran can expand its political influence in the country and put more pressure on its regional adversaries, Israel in particular. Russia on the other hand now has a permanent military presence in the Eastern Mediterranean thanks to the bases under its control in Latakia province. It is also very likely that Syria will become Russia’s most profitable foreign market in the foreseeable future. The possibility of a trial and conviction of the regime and its leader is also very unlikely as Russia continues to protect both with its right of veto. This led to the resignation of the head of the committee that was looking into war crimes committed in Syria as Carla del Ponte was convinced that there was more than enough evidence to convict the regime but it would just not be possible because of Russian interference. The regime might survive this conflict but it would seem that it has sold its soul to its allies as the main reasons that led to the outbreak of the protests and the revolt are still not addressed.

It is very likely that the regime will return to doing the same things that it has always done, which is using the security apparatus to stamp out any form of dissent. There is also the possibility that the security forces in due time will use the footage that was created by rebel forces and shared through social media to identify would-be rebels, apprehend and imprison them. 

The caliphate collapses

The Islamic State is desperately clinging onto the territory that remains under their control in al-Sham. After the fall of Mosul and Tal-Afar in Iraq the terror group only hold territory around Hawija and the deserts near the Syrian border.

In Syria the caliphate is buckling under increasing pressure from all fronts as the capital of Raqqa is under attack by Syrian Democratic Forces and its front lines in central Syria were overrun by the Assad-coalition’s forces. This offensive was aimed at lifting the siege of Deir Ez-Zour where a loyalist garrison held of the jihadists for three years. Now that the core territory of the caliphate is overrun many of its fighters begin to lose heart and look for ways to escape capture and prosecution.

Despite all this, the terror group is far from defeated as their caliph, al-Baghdadi, has eluded capture so far despite numerous attempts to kill and/or capture him, along with several prominent members. In the future the group will return to the shadow organisation it was before, using terror attacks to undermine the regional governments and inflame sectarian tensions while rebuilding its strength, support and forging new alliances with other terror groups, among which possibly Al-Qaeda.

It is very likely that the group in due time will resurface in another part of the world, at the moment the caliphate has a foothold in the Philippines, Afghanistan and West-Africa. It is also plausible that the group will try to gain a foothold in regions where it can ignite new violence and draw on new supporters, for example in Central Asia, or even reignite tensions in post-war regions such as the Balkans, where there are still numerous conservative Muslim communities with radical influences and where the authorities hesitate to go, creating effective no-go zones.

Are the Syrian Democratic Forces our best bet for change?

One of the moderate groups in the Syrian conflict that managed to achieve solid results are the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) that aim for a decentralised political system that guarantees the political and cultural rights of the country’s numerous ethnic and religious minorities. The movement consists of Syrian Kurds, Arabs, Turkmen, Yezidis, Syriacs (to name only a few) but is at the moment dominated by the Syrian Kurds.

The group received the (in)direct support of several western countries in their struggle against the Islamic State, the U.S., the U.K., Germany and France all made contributions varying from logistical support, fire support, arms, training and even Special Operation Forces.

The Obama-administration tried to fight the Islamic State through its proxies as much as possible, trying to avoid a situation where the U.S. would be sent into another costly long-term conflict in the Middle East. As the fight against the Islamic State became more intense, there was a need for more support which resulted into an increase of American troops and hardware in the region.

The Trump administration was partially elected thanks to the rhetoric of then candidate Trump where he claimed on numerous occasions that he would bring the fight against the Islamic State into a higher gear by ‘bombing the shit out of them’.

It didn’t take long after president Trump was elected that there was a significant increase in American troops noticeable in Syria, partially to help support the long-awaited offensive on Raqqa. This higher gear sadly also lead to a noticeable increase in civilian casualties as the battles for Mosul and Raqqa intensified despite implementing procedures that were aimed at avoiding these kind of casualties in the first place.

More war or Cold war?

The question is what the United States’ strategic objectives will be once Raqqa falls and Deir Ez-Zour is within reach. The main focus will be on clearing out the last pockets that will be under the control of the Islamic State and tracking down as many of the leadership as possible before they have the chance to flee the region. It is also vital that the Syrian Democratic Forces consolidate their hold on the northern bank of the Euphrates river to avoid that the Assad-coalition gains a foothold there. Both the Assad-coalition and the SDF will become the two prominent factions in the Syrian conflict which means that they’ll have to come together and start negotiating at some point. The question is whether both parties are interested at this point to begin negotiations because their agendas are as far apart from one another as possible.

Bashar al-Assad has declared on numerous occasions that he intends to regain control of every inch of Syrian territory. Thanks to the support of Iran and Russia is very likely that he will succeed in this if the West does not make it clear to him that this is no longer a realistic scenario in a post-ISIS Syria. At the moment the SDF are in control of a significant part of Syria and thanks to recent successful offensives around the Euphrates, are now also in control of strategic civilian infrastructure like oil fields and dams. This could give them some political leverage during future negotiations. The problem is that the Assad-regime does not recognize the SDF as a political actor in the conflict, which could possible lead to a military confrontation.

It is also unclear where the Trump-administration stands as there have been some very contradicting statements in the past. Initially it looked like the U.S. were planning to continue to support the SDF in Syria while maintaining a presence in the region for several years. This was reported as incorrect as an official announcement stated that the U.S. would end its support to the SDF after the Islamic State was defeated. The Western military presence in Syria is also unofficial and not legal according to international laws. The Assad regime has never given the U.S. or any other western country the permission to build up a military presence within its borders. This is the case with both Iran and Russia, who were officially asked to intervene on behalf of the regime.

The U.S. has also lost a lot of partners in the region over the past years and is trying to keep some sort of influence in the region and its changing dynamics. The relationship with Turkey has hit a low point because the U.S. is providing broad support to an organization which Turkey regards as a terror organization and has opted out of working with Turkey and its proxies in the past. There is also the matter in which Turkey has been cracking down on its people after the failed coup attempt and has become increasingly more authoritarian, which led to criticism from several prominent leaders in the West, among which German chancellor Angela Merkel. Turkey is also displeased with the U.S. because it refuses to hand over the presumed leader of the failed coup who lives in exile in the States, even after ‘a considerable amount of evidence’ was provided to them.

There is also an increasing amount of Russian and Iranian influence noticeable in the region. The Iraqi government announced that it was looking into ways to cooperate more closely with Teheran in the future, while it also began to court several Gulf states which led to a diplomatic crisis and the blockade of Qatar. It is also speculated that Iran has been supporting the Houthi rebels in the Yemeni conflict who are fighting a Saudi-led coalition and have on several occasions embarrassed the Saudi forces with numerous victories.

Russia was awarded an important military contract in both Iraq and Egypt and has also sold it newest air-defence system, the S-400, to Turkey. Russia has also begun with re-establishing ties with Libya, which is still in turmoil after the fall of Gadhaffi.

The U.S. will try to counter these new spheres of influence by securing one of their own with the help of new regional partners. The Syrian and Iraqi Kurds could therefor prove vital for the American strategic objectives in the Middle East. In both regions the U.S. has announced several projects to help these groups with the rebuilding effort and possibly paving the way for an American military presence. The problem with this is that the U.S. will be creating new regional actors and will have to sustain them for a certain period of time. This is very much the case for the northern Syrian democratic federation that is literally surrounded on all sides by hostile governments.

It is very likely that the Assad-coalition is going to test whether the Trump administration is really willing to risk a direct confrontation by standing with the SDF when a battle-hardened force with serious hardware comes knocking. As I mentioned earlier the United States’ presence in the country is unlawful which could lead to an international diplomatic embarrassment when the Assad-coalition calls on the international community to make the U.S. withdraw from Syrian sovereign territory. There are also not enough western troops in Syria to be stationed along the frontlines to discourage the regime’s forces from trying anything and the West doesn’t have enough political capital to enforce a political solution. It also seems unlikely that the Trump administration will be willing to invest enormous amounts of money in the region to help the SDF in fighting the Assad-coalition. Trump famously criticized the previous administration for jumping into another regional conflict that would cost enormous amounts of money to achieve unrealistic objectives that were a waste of time.

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Syrië: Dreigt het Syrische conflict een afgang te worden voor het Westen?

Na bijna zeven jaar van gruwelijke oorlog en honderdduizenden doden lijkt het erop dat het Syrisch conflict een nieuwe fase ingaat. De Assad-coalitie slaagde erin zijn gezag opnieuw te vestigen in grote delen van het land dankzij de steun van zijn bondgenoten. De harde taal en de berekende zetten op politiek vlak die het regime zet doen de hoop op een politieke, duurzame vrede voor de belangrijkste betrokken partijen verdwijnen. De gematigde groepen die momenteel nog gesteund worden door het Westen staan voor een zeer moeilijke periode omdat het niet zeker is of deze een potentiële escalatie van het conflict kunnen afweren.

De rebellen zijn te verdeeld

De Syrische bevolking probeerde initieel door middel van grootschalige protesten druk uit te oefenen op het regime om een aantal hervormingen door te voeren. Zo hoopten ze onder meer  dat het een einde zou betekenen van de autoritaire wurggreep door een geprivilegieerde elite die elke vorm van dissidentie deed verdwijnen met behulp van een zeer uitgebreid netwerk van veiligheidsdiensten. Toen de situatie echter escaleerde werden milities opgericht door burgers om hun huizen, wijken en dorpen te beschermen tegen de knokploegen die door het Assad-regime werden uitgestuurd om dissidenten te intimideren. Deze knokploegen bestonden uit voornamelijk loyalistische paramilitairen die een opportuniteit zagen om zich te kunnen verrijken door schaamteloos te kunnen roven en plunderen. Naarmate het verzet zich begon te verspreiden begonnen deze groeperingen zich beter te organiseren met behulp van soldaten die in grote getallen begonnen over te lopen naar de rebellen.

De fragiele samenwerking tussen de verschillende rebellengroepen in het begin van het Syrische conflict kwam snel onder druk te staan door de uiteenlopende ideologieën en doelstellingen die de verschillende groeperingen hadden. De eerste successen werden overschaduwd door de opkomst van verschillende islamitische groeperingen die de agenda van hun buitenlandse sponsor probeerde door te duwen in het gebied dat ze controleerden. Het momentum dat ze hadden weten op te bouwen was opeens ondergeschikt aan de invloed en de rijkdommen die ze konden verdienen door hun gezag in bepaalde delen van het land te vestigen.

Het gebrek aan coördinatie, terreinwinst en de enorme bedragen die in deze groeperingen gepompt werden door buitenlandse actoren voor aanvullende training en oorlogsmaterieel leidde tot de beslissing om de geldstroom en levering van oorlogsmaterieel geleidelijk aan stop te zetten. Dit gebeurde onder meer door de VS omdat de huidige regering niet langer vond dat het een haalbare strategie was dat teveel geld kostte. Hierdoor dreigen gematigde rebellengroepen nu volledig te worden geabsorbeerd door meer radicale groeperingen. De verschillende de-escalatiezones die werden geïmplementeerd langsheen de frontlijnen benadrukken een belangrijk pijnpunt van hun situatie, namelijk dat er een groot gebrek is aan politieke cohesie tussen deze groepen dat voor voortdurende conflicten zorgt waarbij waardevolle middelen tegen elkaar worden ingezet in plaats van tegen hun gezamenlijke vijand.

Wanneer het Assad-regime zijn focus opnieuw verlegt naar deze regio’s lijkt het onwaarschijnlijk dat deze groeperingen in staat zullen zijn om langdurig effectief weerstand te bieden aan de militaire overmacht van de Assad-coalitie. Deze groeperingen zullen ook op weinig bijstand van de internationale gemeenschap kunnen rekenen vanwege hun radicale overtuigingen.

De Assad-coalitie heeft de bovenhand

De Assad-coalitie is erin geslaagd om momenteel zowel de militaire als de politieke bovenhand te halen in het Syrische conflict dankzij de belangrijke bijdragen in troepen en militair materieel van zijn internationale bondgenoten, met in het bijzonder Iran en Rusland. Dit stelt hen in staat om systematisch bepaalde oppositiegroeperingen te viseren, uit te schakelen en opnieuw hun controle te vestigen over grote delen van het land. Dit verstevigd hun politieke positie op nationaal en internationaal vlak tijdens de vredesonderhandelingen om het conflict te beëindigen.

Bij de start van het Syrische conflict had het regime een zwakke positie en begon het geleidelijk aan meer controle te verliezen over delen van het land waardoor het slechts een kwestie van tijd leek voordat het regime zou vallen. Het leger en de veiligheidsdiensten waren niet in staat om de verschillende groeperingen overal tegelijk effectief te bestrijden. Het regime werd gedwongen om hun middelen te concentreren op de belangrijkste brandhaarden terwijl op andere plaatsen een meer defensieve houding werd aangenomen. De soldaten verschansten zich in hun legerbasissen of bepaalde wijken van een stad. Met deze strategie probeerde het regime tevens aan te tonen dat het de controle niet over het land was verloren omdat het troepen in alle hoeken van het land had gestationeerd. Daarnaast werd de Syrische luchtmacht ingezet om systematisch wijken te verpulveren, wat tot grote aantallen burgerslachtoffers leidde en tot een internationale vluchtelingenstroom.

Dat het regime steun kreeg van verschillende buitenlandse milities was niet voldoende om het tij te keren. De rebellengroepen kregen op hun beurt (in)directe steun van verschillende buitenlandse actoren die het regime liever zagen verdwijnen, waaronder buurland Turkije, de Verenigde Staten en verschillende golfstaten. Dankzij de directe steun van Iraanse elitetroepen en Russisch hoogtechnologisch oorlogsmaterieel was het Assad-regime in staat om haar eerste grote successen te boeken door haar garnizoen in Aleppo te bereiken langs de Khanassar-route. Daarnaast werd de druk opgevoerd op de rebellenposities in en rond de hoofdstad Damascus en meer naar het zuiden in de omgeving van Daraa. Grootschalige rebellenoffensieven rond Aleppo en Hama werden later ook systematisch geblokkeerd in omgezet in nederlagen voor de rebellen.

Het regime slaagt er ook herhaaldelijk in om rebellenposities tot overgave te dwingen dankzij het verzoeningscentrum dat mede door de Russen werd geïnstalleerd. Hierdoor krijgen rebellengroepen de kans om de wapens neer te leggen in ruil voor amnestie of kunnen ze ervoor kiezen om naar het noorden van het land getransporteerd te worden om zich daar bij andere groepen aan te sluiten. Op deze manier kan de Assad-coalitie de druk opvoeren op andere fronten en worden de rebellen meer en meer geconcentreerd in bepaalde delen van het land.

Zowel Iran als Rusland hebben veel te winnen bij een eindoverwinning voor de Assad-coalitie. Iran kan haar politieke invloed in het land versterken, haar aanwezigheid in de regio uitbreiden en meer druk uitoefenen op zijn regionale tegenstanders, in het bijzonder Israël. Rusland kan een permanente militaire aanwezigheid uitbouwen in het oostelijke deel van de Middellandse Zee dankzij de basissen die het in de Latakiaprovincie bemant. Daarnaast is het goed mogelijk dat Syrië de belangrijkste afzetmarkt wordt van Russische goederen en diensten in de nabije toekomst. Een potentiële vervolging en veroordeling van het regime omwille van de gruweldaden dat het regime pleegde tijdens het conflict, waaronder het gebruik van vaatbommen, thermobarische en chemische wapens,  is ook niet langer mogelijk omdat het beschermd wordt door Ruslands vetorecht, ondanks dat er meer dan voldoende bewijzen zijn. Het hoofd van de onderzoekscommissie met betrekking tot Syrië, Carla del Ponte, gaf hierdoor haar ontslag bij de onderzoekscommissie. Het regime mag dan wel voorlopig aan de macht blijven maar het heeft mogelijk zijn ziel verkocht aan zijn bondgenoten omdat de pijnpunten die het protest en het daaropvolgende conflict deden ontvlammen, niet behandeld werden.

Het Syrische regime zal dan ook waarschijnlijk terugkeren naar een gelijkaardige manier van werken door systematisch repressief op te treden tegen dissidenten. Syrische veiligheidsdiensten zullen systematisch mensen beginnen op te pakken die mogelijk gelinkt werden aan rebellengroepen en konden worden geïdentificeerd aan de hand van beeldmateriaal dat werd gemaakt door de rebellen en verspreid werd met behulp van sociale media tijdens het conflict.

Het kalifaat valt

De Islamitische Staat probeert wanhopig zijn grip te behouden op het territorium dat het nog onder zijn controle heeft. Na de val van Mosul en Tal Afar in Irak heeft de terreurgroep daar enkel nog de regio rond Hawija onder zijn controle in het noorden van het land en een deel van het woestijngebied dat grenst aan buurland Syrië.

In Syrië wordt de terreurgroep ook langs alle kanten onder druk gezet. De hoofdstad Raqqa wordt systematisch door de Syrische Democratische Strijdkrachten veroverd, in Centraal-Syrië werden de jihadisten compleet overrompeld door een offensief van de Assad-coalitie die probeerde de stad Deir Ez-Zour te bereiken waar een garnizoen van het regime gelegerd is. Nu het hartland van de terreurgroep systematisch veroverd wordt en ze er niet in slagen om weerstand te bieden aan al deze druk, beginnen veel van de strijders de moed te verliezen en de regio te ontvluchten. Verschillende bronnen melden dat (buitenlandse) jihadisten proberen naar de omringende landen te vluchten om te vermijden dat ze opgepakt worden.

De groepering is desondanks helemaal niet verslagen, hun zelfverklaarde kalief al-Baghdadi is ondanks verschillende pogingen hoogstwaarschijnlijk nog in leven en verschillende spilfiguren wisten de dans te ontspringen. De terreurgroep zal dan ook in de nabije toekomst terugkeren naar hun kernactiviteiten, een schaduworganisatie die aanslagen zal plegen op publieke doelwitten om regeringen te ondermijnen en in te spelen op sektarische spanningen. Daarnaast zal de groepering leren uit de fouten die ze gemaakt hebben en zich heruitvinden door nieuwe bondgenootschappen te sluiten met andere terreurgroepen, waaronder al-Qaeda.

Op termijn zal de groep dan ook opnieuw opduiken in een andere regio van de wereld. Momenteel heeft de groepering ook een aanwezigheid in de Filipijnen, Afghanistan en West-Afrika. Daarnaast is er ook de mogelijkheid dat de groepering afdelingen opzet in centraal Azië door daar in te spelen om socio-politieke spanningen. Het is zelfs mogelijk dat de groepering voet aan grond in Europa zal proberen te krijgen door oude wonden te openen. In het voormalige Joegoslavië zijn nog steeds verschillende conservatieve moslimgemeenschappen en no-go zones te vinden wat een potentiële broeihaard van extremisme zou kunnen betekenen.

Bieden de Syrische Democratische Strijdkrachten (SDF) een oplossing?

Eén van de gematigde groeperingen in het Syrische conflict dat wél systematisch successen wist te boeken zijn de Syrische Democratische Strijdkrachten (SDF) die streven naar een gedecentraliseerd politiek systeem dat de politieke en culturele rechten van de verschillende etnische minderheden in het land erkent en garandeert in het dagelijkse leven. Deze verzameling van groeperingen bestaat onder meer uit Syrische Koerden, Arabieren, Turkmenen, Yezidi’s, Assyriërs maar wordt momenteel gedomineerd door de Syrische Koerden.

De groepering werd door een aantal westerse landen (in)direct gesteund in hun strijd tegen de Islamitische Staat, waaronder Groot-Brittannië, Duitsland, Frankrijk en de Verenigde Staten de grootste bijdragen leverden met logistieke steun, bombardementen, militaire training, wapenleveringen en het inzetten van Special Operation Forces. 

Onder de Obamaregering werd de strijd tegen de Islamitische Staat initieel zoveel mogelijk met een hands off-mentaliteit gevoerd om te vermijden dat de Verenigde Staten zich opnieuw in een langdurig conflict zouden storten dat mogelijk weer astronomische bedragen en Amerikaanse levens zou kosten. Naarmate de strijd vorderde bleek er nood aan meer ondersteuning, wat leidde tot een gevoelige stijging van mensen en materieel in de regio.

De Trumpregering kwam aan de macht mede dankzij de retoriek van de toenmalige kandidaat Donald Trump waarbij hij meermaals verkondigde dat hij de strijd tegen de Islamitische Staat niet alleen in een hogere versnelling zou jagen, maar ook beslissend zou beëindigen door ‘hen tot pulp te bombarderen’. Het duurde dan ook niet lang voordat er een gevoelige stijging van Amerikaanse grondtroepen in Syrië opgemerkt kon worden om het langverwachte offensief om Raqqa te ondersteunen. Deze hogere versnelling leidde jammer genoeg ook tot een gevoelige stijging van burgerslachtoffers in de gevechten in Mosul en Raqqa ondanks dat de internationale coalitie een aantal procedures heeft geïmplementeerd om het risico op burgerslachtoffers te beperken.

Totale oorlog of Koude oorlog?

De vraag is echter nu wat de doelstellingen van het Westen, en in het bijzonder de Verenigde Staten, zullen zijn nu Raqqa binnenkort lijkt te vallen en Deir Ez-Zour binnen bereik ligt. De focus zal ongetwijfeld liggen op het opruimen van de laatste gebieden die onder de controle van de Islamitische Staat vallen het opsporen van zoveel mogelijk hooggeplaatste figuren binnen de organisatie voordat ze de kans krijgen de regio te ontvluchten. Daarnaast is het ook belangrijk dat de Syrische Democratische Strijdkrachten de noordelijke oever van de Eufraat onder hun controle krijgen om te vermijden dat de Assad-coalitie hier een aanwezigheid kan opbouwen. Op deze manier worden zowel de Assad-coalitie als de Noord-Syrische Democratische Federatie de twee grootste facties in het Syrische conflict, waardoor de twee partijen wel met elkaar moeten onderhandelen om een vreedzame oplossing te vinden. De vraag is echter of de beide partijen wel met elkaar willen onderhandelen omdat de doelstellingen van de twee facties mijlenver uit elkaar liggen.

Bashar al-Assad heeft verschillende malen verkondigd dat hij elke intentie heeft om enkele vierkante meter van Syrië te heroveren om zijn gezag opnieuw over het hele territorium te vestigen. Dankzij de steun van Iran en Rusland is het dan ook zeer goed mogelijk dat hij hierin zal slagen indien het Westen hier niet tijdig een duidelijk signaal stuurt dat dat niet langer een realistisch scenario is in een post-ISIS Syrië. Momenteel controleren de SDF een belangrijk deel van het Syrisch grondgebied en hebben ze ook de controle verworven over een aantal strategische civiele infrastructuur, waaronder olievelden in het oosten van het land, en verschillende dammen langsheen de Eufraat. Dit geeft hen een zeker politiek kapitaal bij de onderhandelingen die in de toekomst plaatsvinden. Het probleem is echter dat het Assad-regime tot op heden de SDF niet erkend heeft als een politieke factor in het conflict, waardoor een militaire confrontatie niet uitgesloten is. 

De houding van de Trump-regering is ook allesbehalve éénduidig geweest omdat het er eerst op leek dat de Amerikanen de SDF in Syrië zouden blijven steunen. Dit werd ook bevestigd door een hooggeplaatste functionaris van de Amerikaanse regering, wat enkele dagen nadien weerlegd werd door een officiële mededeling dat de Amerikaanse steun aan de SDF zou eindigen zodra de Islamitische Staat verslagen zou zijn in het land. De westerse aanwezigheid in Syrië is tevens ook niet officieel, noch legaal volgens internationale wetten. Het Assad-regime heeft nooit officieel toestemming gegeven aan de westerse coalitie om een militaire aanwezigheid uit te bouwen in het land, in tegenstelling tot Iran en Rusland, waaraan wél officieel hulp werd gevraagd.

De Amerikanen zijn ook veel vrienden in de regio kwijtgespeeld de laatste jaren en proberen hoe dan ook een zekere invloed in de regio te behouden. De relatie met de Turkije is de laatste jaren aanzienlijk verzuurd doordat de Amerikanen (in)direct steun verleenden aan een groepering die door Turkije als een terreurorganisatie wordt beschouwd in plaats van nauwer samen te werken met groeperingen die door Turkije gesteund worden. De manier waarop Turkse autoriteiten na de mislukte couppoging in 2016 zeer autoritair begonnen op te treden tegen elke vorm van politieke oppositie deed ook heel veel bondgenoten van Turkije de wenkbrauwen fronsen en leidde zelfs tot scherpe kritiek van verschillende prominente leiders, waaronder Angela Merkel. Turkije is ook nog steeds bitsig omdat de Amerikanen weigeren de vermoedelijke leider van de couppoging, Fethullah Gülen, uit te leveren nadat een aanzienlijke hoeveelheid bewijsmateriaal werd overgedragen.

Daarnaast is er een groeiende invloed van Iran en Rusland te bemerken in de Arabische wereld. Bagdad maakte bekend dat het in de toekomst nauwer wenst samen te werken met Teheran en begon ook politieke relaties uit te bouwen met Qatar, wat tot een diplomatieke crisis en een economische blokkade leidde. Daarnaast wordt er ook gespeculeerd dat Iran sinds geruime tijd de Jemenitische Houti-rebellen steunt wat leidde tot een interventie geleid door Saudi-Arabië.

Rusland kreeg een belangrijk militair contract toegewezen voor het leveren van nieuw oorlogsmaterieel aan de Iraakse regering, wat enkele weken later een gelijkaardig resultaat opleverde voor Egypte. Daarnaast verkocht Rusland ook zijn nieuwste luchtafweersysteem, de S-400, aan Turkije. Rusland is ook begonnen met enige invloed uit te bouwen in Libië, een land dat na de val van Gadhaffi nog steeds geen politieke stabiliteit heeft gevonden.

De Amerikanen zullen deze groeiende invloedsfeer dan ook met lede ogen aanzien en zullen dit proberen te counteren door een eigen militaire aanwezigheid op te bouwen met nieuwe regionale partners. De Iraakse en Syrische Koerden lijken hiervoor de beste keuze. In beide regio’s zijn al verschillende projecten van start gegaan om bij de heropbouw te helpen en de drempel voor een mogelijke Amerikaanse militaire aanwezigheid te verlagen, zo werd in Iraaks Koerdistan een project voor een nieuwe Amerikaanse ambassade goedgekeurd en begonnen de heropbouw van een ziekenhuis in Syrië. Het probleem hiermee is dat de Amerikanen mogelijk op een kunstmatige manier nieuwe politieke actoren in de regio gaan creëren die zonder de regelmatige steun van Amerikaanse fondsen niet op eigen benen kunnen staan. Dit is in het bijzonder een potentiële valkuil voor het Noord-Syrische Democratische Federalisme, dat omringd zal worden door regeringen die dit democratisch model het zonlicht niet gunnen. 

De kans is bijzonder groot dat de Assad-coalitie de VS gaat testen om te zien in welke mate ze bereid zijn noordoost Syrië bij te staan wanneer er een getraind leger met hoogtechnologisch en zwaar oorlogsmaterieel aan de frontlijn staat. Zoals eerder vermeld is de westerse aanwezigheid in Syrië er om de Islamitische Staat te bestrijden en kreeg het daarvoor niet eens de toestemming van het Assad-regime. Dit is in strijd met het internationaal recht wat tot een diplomatieke kaakslag kan leiden wanneer de Verenigde Staten hiervoor op het matje geroepen zouden worden langs de betrokken kanalen. Daarnaast zijn er niet genoeg Westerse troepen om ze langsheen de volledige frontlijn te stationeren en een directe militaire escalatie te vermijden, noch is de politieke positie van de westerse coalitie sterk genoeg om een politieke oplossing te forceren. Het lijkt ook onrealistisch dat de Trump-regering bereid zal zijn om jarenlang enorme investeringen te doen waardoor de SDF in staat zouden kunnen zijn om de Assad-coalitie effectief te bestrijden omdat Trump tijdens zijn campagne meermaals de gigantische uitgaven in buitenlandse avonturen hekelde als onrealistisch en een verspilling.

De westerse landen staan op dit moment voor een moeilijke keuze, proberen ze een politieke oplossing af te dwingen door resoluut aan de zijde te blijven van hun regionale partner of kiezen ze ervoor om eieren voor hun geld te kiezen en de aftocht te blazen...

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(War on Terror) - Why the West should take back its jihadists

    

The global war on terror has been a costly one… Since 9/11 thousands of innocent lives were lost to a variety of attacks in major cities across the world, using tactics that until then defied belief and made many people worry about their safety in general.  Airliners, cars and lorries became weapons of war, people enjoying a night out were attacked in bars, streets, restaurants, beaches and even concert halls became legitimate targets for terror attacks…

Governments were quick to enact new laws that gave intelligence  agencies and police forces more leeway and resources to go after possible suspects and stronger, more reliable information sharing networks were established to help avoid new attacks… We went to war against terror groups in parts of the world they called their own and in some places were more successful in driving them out than others. We have lost thousands of servicemen, security and intelligence agents… and the war is not over. When one region is stabilized, another becomes a hotspot.

The current war on terror has changed, and will continue to change the mindset of the public as the war that once was fought on the other side of the world, has come to our own shores. The rise of the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq saw an unprecedented amount of foreign fighters travelling to the region to become citizens there, take up arms and fight against any nation that threatened it. Even from the West thousands of youngsters and entire families set off to join one of the groups in the region.

Rambo jihadism?

Although a portion of these westerners returned as soon as they realized that the reality wasn’t exactly as what they had been told through propaganda and recruiting channels, there were still more than enough prepared to keep the fight going. Some of them were killed as the conflict raged on but now that the tide has turned against some of them in the al-Sham region, there are concerns that these fighters might return home to either carry out attacks or set up new terror cells. There are however a number of them that were captured by allied forces on the ground, that were imprisoned and debriefed and now await their fate in a cell… but western governments aren’t too keen on taking them back…

The obvious reasons are that they might be (in)directly involved in planning future terror attacks. These individuals often have received the necessary training to carry out attacks in a variety of ways, using equipment that is available in modern society on a day-to-day basis. They have served at the front in some capacity, giving them the experience and knowledge on how to handle a variety of deadly weapon in a combat-like situation. They could share this knowledge with other individuals who are looking for ways to inflict damage and take innocent lives.

But even incarcerating them might give them an opportunity to recruit new members from vulnerable groups in prison, which in turn could carry out attacks or set up new terror cells after they are released. There are a lot of jihadists whose lives have gotten off the rails, who choose a life of (petty) crime and have been incarcerated before they were ‘found’ and given a chance at redemption through fighting a holy war for Islam against the apostates and non-believers. And there are a lot of the same vulnerable people incarcerated at this very moment, looking for an opportunity at redemption.

Setting up deradicalization programs is also a difficult thing as there are as many views on how to do it as there are people writing about it. Attempts have been already made, in Jordan for example, with some success but to truly be effective we would need to implement it on a much broader scale. In the best case new institutions (or wings) would have to be constructed to make sure that these individuals are kept segregated and controlled in a manner that allows them to be fully engaged before they are gradually released into the general population of an institution and, in due time, society itself.

Putting these individuals on trial might prove more difficult than anticipated as well… The process of gathering all the evidence that is required to build a solid case against these individuals depends on numerous factors, the most important two of which are time and money…  Two things most governments could be unwilling to spend large amounts of on a sensitive matter such as this in times like these.

Throw away the key?

Is letting these individuals continue to sit in a cell in a foreign country the best thing to do? One could argue that this is the consequence of choices they made, the result of a chain of events they have put in motion themselves. Not only did they leave, most of them berated their former countries and even threatened them with attacks and the implementation of sharia law in its society. Taking away their citizenship and just forget about them seems the quickest and easiest way out. The United Kingdom has just taken away the citizenship of more than one hundred jihadists, sending a clear signal that it no longer wants anything to do with them and that those who are considering to do the same should think twice before doing it. Other countries are probably looking into doing the same thing but caution is advised since it might break international laws as no person can be stateless… But there might be an even greater risk in not taking them back.

These men and women already have gained some sort of status by like-minded people, almost becoming poster boys for recruiters and potential candidates. By not addressing this situation we risk that these people will be eventually set free and either reconnect with members of their former organization or travel to a new potential theatre of war. A similar situation arose during the war in the Balkans in the 90s. Hundreds of jihadists were left behind after the fighting who in time travelled to Afghanistan and more recently, Syria. Even now there are still no-go zones where Salafist communities have free reign and their influence is spreading.

A new way of life?

Do we have to accept that terror attacks are becoming less of rarity in our cities’ streets? Yes, sadly it is becoming something we have to accept, at least for now. But it does not mean that it has to be like this indefinitely. We can choose to accept that we cannot stop every single one that is determined to take to the streets with the intentions of harming innocent bystanders. What we can do is look for ways to fight this war in a manner that determines that we will win it.

If we can show leniency to those who were led astray we can use them to tell about their experiences so that we can continue to understand how they got to that point. They can share their stories at schools, mosques and other venues to show that the message they were told is full of lies and empty promises.

I do not mean to say that these people need to be released into society as soon as they get debriefed and get off the plane. But they should be put on trial for the crimes they have committed, sentenced and been given the chance, just like any other offender to rehabilitate before becoming a part of our society once more.

If we continue to turn a blind eye to what has happened in the (recent) past without being prepared to do right thing, which might be more difficult, take longer and cost more instead of using the quick and easy solution, we continue to risk the lives of those around, those whom we love and hold dear for decades..


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USA - Middle East: Donald Trump severely compromised U.S foreign policy in the Middle East

During the presidential election campaign of 2016 Donald Trump quickly made headlines with his bold statements on domestic and foreign issues. He would repeal and replace Obamacare, build a great southern wall “to keep the bad guys out,” rebuild the aging American infrastructure and turn the fight with the Islamic State into high gear by “bombing the shit out of them.”

Trump’s controversial travel ban, aimed at monitoring and decreasing the arrival of Muslims from a number of Middle Eastern countries for so-called security reasons, caused a major uproar as thousands of people took to the streets across the States to voice their concerns over the direction this new administration was taking their country. Although the first draft was dismissed,  the administration made it clear that it would put it forward again as the threat was real and it was only a matter of time before an attack took place without the necessary precautions. The American Supreme Court recently decided to allow certain parts of the ban to be implemented although there are still ambiguous terms in there that will cause problems in the near future.

President Trump’s unique insights on how to revitalize the American economy would lead to the withdrawal from the Paris Climate Accord as there was no convincing argument regarding global warming. The (non-binding) agreement was extremely hard on the United States’ coal mining industry while other global powers such as India and China could even increase their emission output. The Dakota Pipeline project that was put on hold because of environmental concerns was restarted despite protests and concerns from several politicians. As the whole world continues to put its hope in renewable energies, the Trump administration sticks to coal and oil and now even has plans to expand its fracking operations, something that was deemed too expensive before and could potentially be dangerous to the countries’ water supplies although these concerns are dismissed because at the moment there haven’t been any conclusive studies.

After taking office, Trump was quick to resurrect and push through an arms deal with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, worth over one billion dollars, which was tabled under the Obama administration because it was considered immoral as the ordnance might be used in the Syrian conflict as well as Yemen. The Trump administration had no such qualms as it was “a great deal” that would result in a major boost of the American economy and a much-needed win for the president. Trump was also quick to pick the Saudis’ side in their beef with Qatar as the Wahhabi kingdom moves to send a clear message through the Arabian peninsula that working with its regional nemesis Iran would be very unwise. Interestingly the rest of the administration was more hesitant to declare a side as Qatar hosts an important American base that provides the U.S. with a foothold in the region.

Trump also took the gloves off in the fight against the Islamic State as the air campaign against the terror group was intensified and additional forces were sent to provide training and indirect fire support in the campaigns in Mosul and Raqqa. This escalation resulted in a noticeable increase in civilian casualties, something the previous administration tried to avoid. Although it has to be said that this number could only increase as the fighting would intensify in urban areas, dropping heavy ordnance on civilian infrastructure when it is known that civilians are used as human shields sends the wrong message to the people you’re trying to liberate and get on your side, period.

The Trump administration’s attitude towards the Assad regime has changed a number of times as they initially wanted him gone, then wanted him to stay to provide some stability in the transition period (when it still looked like the status quo was still somewhat in effect). However after the chemical attack in Khan Sheikhoun in Idlib province the administration called Assad unfit for office and even fired Tomahawk missiles toward a Syrian airbase “to send a clear message,” only to declare a few months later (by Rex Tillerson) that Assad’s future should be determined by Russia, effectively declaring that Russia was in the driving seat from then on. This constant shifting does not inspire confidence in the US’ long-time allies and the proxies it is backing on the ground.

Trump’s newest attempt to show his diplomatic prowess may very well be the final nail in the coffin for the American influence in the Syrian conflict and the region. By ending the CIA-funded arming program in support for these groups it can only spell certain doom for them as the American-supplied Anti-Tank Guided Missiles (ATGMs) are an essential part of the rebels’ strategy in holding the Assad forces at bay. Even worse is that it was done to mend the relationship with Russia, a backer of Assad, which could be perceived by the rebel groups as a form of betrayal. What few moderate groups remain in Syria are now at risk of disbanding completely or being absorbed by more radical groups such as Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham. This group is one of the dominant factions in the opposition and currently moves to secure its hold over the other rebel groups in Idlib province.

It is very possible that this initial dismay could turn into an anti-American (or anti-western) attitude which could lead to an effective recruiting ground for terror groups that aim to carry out attacks against western installations or assets in the region or even on their home turf. This could lead to a difficult relationship with its regional partners, for example the kingdom of Jordan, as they could get caught in the crossfire. Other partners who are have been looking for opportunities to increase their influence and role in the region, Turkey and Israel, might even distance themselves further from the Trump as they begin to set their own course that serves their own interests best, rather than looking towards the U.S. for approval.

It looks like Trump’s policy of ‘America First’ is becoming reality, but not the way he intended…By charting a course for the U.S. that serves its own agenda this administration will continue to alienate the country from its allies and erode the foundations of several important institutions it was one a prominent member of… ‘America First’ could very well become ‘America Alone’ while other countries move in to fill the vacuum.

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Lebanon Refugee Crisis: the next possible hotspot in the Middle East?

Lebanon’s prime minister al-Hariri stated that his country urgently needed more international help in order to provide for the 1,5 million Syrian refugees that are currently living there.

Almost seven years into the Syrian conflict the number of refugees continue to be a major cause for concern for the region and the international community. More than 5 million Syrians have fled the country and are living in camps across the region, with around 3 million Syrian refugees living in camps in Turkey, 1,5 million in Lebanon and the remainder living in Jordan, (southern) Iraq and Egypt or moving even further away in an attempt to reach Europe and the US.

Adding to this, around 6 million Syrians are currently displaced inside Syria, living in areas under control of the different factions . This number is truly astounding when the population of Syria had been estimated to around 17 million people in 2014. This would mean that almost two-thirds(!) of the Syrian population are currently (in)directly forcibly displaced by the ongoing conflict.

Hosting and providing for the refugees in Lebanon hasn’t been an easy task. Lebanon has been trying to deal with a slowing economic growth and numerous other domestic problems, but at the moment the population of Lebanon has increased by twenty-five percent only through the refugee influx, which has put a tremendous strain on available resources and services. Although the situation hasn’t gotten out of hand up until now, the atmosphere is definitely changing.

Lebanese people are growing tired of the continuous presence of Syrians in the streets, looking to sell anything they can or offering themselves for low-paying labour jobs. They also believe that the government is currently doing more for them than their own people. This could potentially become a very dangerous situation when the necessary international aid does not arrive in the needed quantities to start supporting the Lebanese government and relieve the tension in its society. An example of this is when a short while ago two separate incidents occurred in the camps where fires broke out and dozens of tents, along with all the people’s belongings went up in flames. Several people, among which children, were severely injured. The incidents were classified as unfortunate accidents due to a technical malfunction of hardware. Thanks to humanitarian organisations operating in the country efforts were made to rebuild the necessary number of tents to help the people affected by the disaster.

People could easily start taking matters into their own hands when the situation is not properly addressed by the Lebanese government and the international community. Targeted assaults, forced entry into the camps and arson are only a few things that come to mind of what could happen… What is even worse, an escalation or lack of initiative could reignite the sectarian violence that has cast a shadow over the country’s recent history and to this day hasn’t been truly settled.

When Lebanon was under colonial rule after the Great War, the Maronite Christian community had a strong working relationship with the French and gradually became the dominant faction in politics after its independence in the 1940s. During the Cold War several Arab groups were inspired by the ideas of socialism and pan-Arab ideologies which led to an increasing polarized society. When clashes broke out in 1975 these Arab groups were (in-directly supported by the Soviet-Union(’s allies in the region) while the Christian communities were supported leaned towards the West. It didn’t take long before Syria and Israel joined the fray and the US (as part of their Cold War’s containment policy) became indirectly involved.

In the 1980s Israel invaded Lebanon to stamp out insurgents that were attacking from there and an international force had to be sent to intervene. It was only in 1990 that hostilities officially came to an end through the Taif Agreement but to this day tensions are high, clashes are frequent in several parts of the country between communities and parts of the Taif Agreement haven’t been implemented or followed. 

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Syria: Ceasefires are an effective part of the Assad-coalition’s strategy

When the Syrian Uprising escalated into nation-wide violence and numerous groups were formed to protect their communities and fight the Assad government, momentum was on the opposition’s side as it didn’t take long before Assad loyalists were starting to lose control of large territories and were ousted from numerous cities across the country.

The Syrian Arab Army’s initial strategy was to keep a force in all corners of Syria to be able to hold onto the claim that the regime had not lost control of the country. There was still an SAA presence in the cities of Aleppo, Qamishli, Hasakah, Deir ez-Zour and Daraa although the majority of these cities were under the control of rebel groups as well as a large part of the surrounding countryside.

It was in the western part of the country that numerous pockets of rebel hold-outs began to form. The Assad loyalists began to besiege this pockets to avoid them from linking up with one another, defeat them quickly if the opportunity should arise or just force them to surrender by either bombing or starving them into submission. This tactic seemed to work as these fronts remained mostly static and could there for be manned by less experienced troops while the heavy lifting would be done by the air force and time itself…

The Syrian Arab Army had to prioritize its military efforts as it had to fight off rebel offensives on numerous fronts and it was struggling to keep all the fronts manned effectively. In Syria every man of fighting age has to serve several years in the armed forces and it could in theory gather an effective fighting force in a short amount of time. The problem was that many men refused to answer the call to arms to fight for the regime and joined the opposition or fled the country to avoid being conscripted and forced to fight. There were also numerous defections of servicemen among all branches and ranks that joined the opposition in their struggle against the regime. This resulted in a depleted fighting force on which the Assad regime had to rely to do the fighting. It could count on its most elite units of the republican guard, composed of mostly Shia men, to fight fanatically for the survival of the regime as well. But there was still a need for more men and therefor patriots, opportunists and those willing to fight for fame and loot were organised into units as National Defence Forces. Efforts were also made to attract and organize additional paramilitary forces that would be willing to fight for the regime, among which the Lebanese Hezbollah paramilitary and the Palestinian paramilitary group. But it still wasn’t enough as Assad forces were still too spread thin.

To effectively besiege this numerous pockets, a lot of preparation logistics and manpower was needed to make sure that those who were besieged couldn’t get out, were checked at any attempt as they would try to break out and to make sure that nothing could get in or out of the area, whether it were supplies, weapons, fighters, refugees, food or medicine. It basically came down to numbers, if you have to besiege a hundred fighting men you almost certainly need twice that number to keep them in there. As there were a few dozen rebel pockets across western Syria with several dozen fighters in each of them who were looking for a fight, the numbers quickly show that the Assad regime would be in trouble sooner than later. It would need an effective strategy to make sure that it could keep the opposition in check with as many men as possible while ceding as little territory as possible.

Thus began a truly ingenious part of warfare, the juggling of treaties and forces to keep a delicate balance while contact was established with the regime’s allies abroad. Whenever a crisis arose, the Assad regime was quick to announce a ceasefire in another part of the country for an amount of time that allowed government forces to redeploy and assist in ongoing operations there. This strategy was a vital part of the regime’s efforts and was used time and time again. Often terms were agreed upon which the regime would later not enforce, humanitarian convoys to rebel pockets were often stopped, delayed and even looted of some of its supplies. When the agreement was then dissolved and fighting resumed, the regime would already have troops in place to fight on. The rebel forces were too fragmented to counter the strategy. For most of the people in these pockets it must’ve been a relief to know that for a short amount of time no bullets and bombs would fly around them. One can only imagine how the situation on the ground could’ve been if the opposition would have declined the ceasefires and continued to keep the pressure on the regime’s forces.

Even now, with the numerous de-escalation zones implemented across Syria, I personally see mostly gains for the regime’s forces. It gives their forces precious time to regroup, rest, resupply and be trained to use better equipment sent by their international backers. It also allows them to secure vital territory in other parts of the country which strengthens the regime’s position during the peace talks.

 For the rebels though, it spell mostly doom. The opposition remains too divided to this day, moderates and more radical groups continue to bicker among themselves for territory and influence. In Idlib, which is considered by many the heart of the opposition movement in western Syria, clashes continue to break out between its prominent factions. A lull in the fighting is the worst thing that can happen to these undisciplined troops as they can no longer focus on the fight against the enemy and soon after they will begin to appreciate the calm and the lack of gunfire, they’ll begin to think of friends and family, or they’ll simply grow bored with the situation or each other.

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