When the Syrian
Uprising escalated into nation-wide violence and numerous groups were formed to
protect their communities and fight the Assad government, momentum was on the
opposition’s side as it didn’t take long before Assad loyalists were starting
to lose control of large territories and were ousted from numerous cities
across the country.
The Syrian
Arab Army’s initial strategy was to keep a force in all corners of Syria to be
able to hold onto the claim that the regime had not lost control of the
country. There was still an SAA presence in the cities of Aleppo, Qamishli,
Hasakah, Deir ez-Zour and Daraa although the majority of these cities were
under the control of rebel groups as well as a large part of the surrounding
countryside.
It was in
the western part of the country that numerous pockets of rebel hold-outs began
to form. The Assad loyalists began to besiege this pockets to avoid them from
linking up with one another, defeat them quickly if the opportunity should
arise or just force them to surrender by either bombing or starving them into
submission. This tactic seemed to work as these fronts remained mostly static
and could there for be manned by less experienced troops while the heavy
lifting would be done by the air force and time itself…
The Syrian
Arab Army had to prioritize its military efforts as it had to fight off rebel
offensives on numerous fronts and it was struggling to keep all the fronts
manned effectively. In Syria every man of fighting age has to serve several
years in the armed forces and it could in theory gather an effective fighting
force in a short amount of time. The problem was that many men refused to
answer the call to arms to fight for the regime and joined the opposition or
fled the country to avoid being conscripted and forced to fight. There were
also numerous defections of servicemen among all branches and ranks that joined
the opposition in their struggle against the regime. This resulted in a
depleted fighting force on which the Assad regime had to rely to do the fighting.
It could count on its most elite units of the republican guard, composed of
mostly Shia men, to fight fanatically for the survival of the regime as well.
But there was still a need for more men and therefor patriots, opportunists and
those willing to fight for fame and loot were organised into units as National
Defence Forces. Efforts were also made to attract and organize additional
paramilitary forces that would be willing to fight for the regime, among which the
Lebanese Hezbollah paramilitary and the Palestinian paramilitary group. But it
still wasn’t enough as Assad forces were still too spread thin.
To effectively
besiege this numerous pockets, a lot of preparation logistics and manpower was
needed to make sure that those who were besieged couldn’t get out, were checked
at any attempt as they would try to break out and to make sure that nothing
could get in or out of the area, whether it were supplies, weapons, fighters,
refugees, food or medicine. It basically came down to numbers, if you have to
besiege a hundred fighting men you almost certainly need twice that number to
keep them in there. As there were a few dozen rebel pockets across western
Syria with several dozen fighters in each of them who were looking for a fight,
the numbers quickly show that the Assad regime would be in trouble sooner than
later. It would need an effective strategy to make sure that it could keep the
opposition in check with as many men as possible while ceding as little
territory as possible.
Thus began
a truly ingenious part of warfare, the juggling of treaties and forces to keep
a delicate balance while contact was established with the regime’s allies
abroad. Whenever a crisis arose, the Assad regime was quick to announce a
ceasefire in another part of the country for an amount of time that allowed
government forces to redeploy and assist in ongoing operations there. This
strategy was a vital part of the regime’s efforts and was used time and time
again. Often terms were agreed upon which the regime would later not enforce, humanitarian convoys to rebel pockets were often stopped, delayed and even looted of some of its supplies. When the agreement was then dissolved and fighting resumed, the regime would already have troops in place to fight on. The rebel forces were too fragmented to counter the strategy. For most
of the people in these pockets it must’ve been a relief to know that for a
short amount of time no bullets and bombs would fly around them. One can only
imagine how the situation on the ground could’ve been if the opposition would
have declined the ceasefires and continued to keep the pressure on the regime’s
forces.
Even now,
with the numerous de-escalation zones implemented across Syria, I personally see
mostly gains for the regime’s forces. It gives their forces precious time to
regroup, rest, resupply and be trained to use better equipment sent by their
international backers. It also allows them to secure vital territory in other
parts of the country which strengthens the regime’s position during the peace
talks.
For the rebels though, it spell mostly doom.
The opposition remains too divided to this day, moderates and more radical
groups continue to bicker among themselves for territory and influence. In
Idlib, which is considered by many the heart of the opposition movement in
western Syria, clashes continue to break out between its prominent factions. A
lull in the fighting is the worst thing that can happen to these undisciplined
troops as they can no longer focus on the fight against the enemy and soon after
they will begin to appreciate the calm and the lack of gunfire, they’ll begin
to think of friends and family, or they’ll simply grow bored with the situation
or each other.
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