Syria: Ceasefires are an effective part of the Assad-coalition’s strategy

When the Syrian Uprising escalated into nation-wide violence and numerous groups were formed to protect their communities and fight the Assad government, momentum was on the opposition’s side as it didn’t take long before Assad loyalists were starting to lose control of large territories and were ousted from numerous cities across the country.

The Syrian Arab Army’s initial strategy was to keep a force in all corners of Syria to be able to hold onto the claim that the regime had not lost control of the country. There was still an SAA presence in the cities of Aleppo, Qamishli, Hasakah, Deir ez-Zour and Daraa although the majority of these cities were under the control of rebel groups as well as a large part of the surrounding countryside.

It was in the western part of the country that numerous pockets of rebel hold-outs began to form. The Assad loyalists began to besiege this pockets to avoid them from linking up with one another, defeat them quickly if the opportunity should arise or just force them to surrender by either bombing or starving them into submission. This tactic seemed to work as these fronts remained mostly static and could there for be manned by less experienced troops while the heavy lifting would be done by the air force and time itself…

The Syrian Arab Army had to prioritize its military efforts as it had to fight off rebel offensives on numerous fronts and it was struggling to keep all the fronts manned effectively. In Syria every man of fighting age has to serve several years in the armed forces and it could in theory gather an effective fighting force in a short amount of time. The problem was that many men refused to answer the call to arms to fight for the regime and joined the opposition or fled the country to avoid being conscripted and forced to fight. There were also numerous defections of servicemen among all branches and ranks that joined the opposition in their struggle against the regime. This resulted in a depleted fighting force on which the Assad regime had to rely to do the fighting. It could count on its most elite units of the republican guard, composed of mostly Shia men, to fight fanatically for the survival of the regime as well. But there was still a need for more men and therefor patriots, opportunists and those willing to fight for fame and loot were organised into units as National Defence Forces. Efforts were also made to attract and organize additional paramilitary forces that would be willing to fight for the regime, among which the Lebanese Hezbollah paramilitary and the Palestinian paramilitary group. But it still wasn’t enough as Assad forces were still too spread thin.

To effectively besiege this numerous pockets, a lot of preparation logistics and manpower was needed to make sure that those who were besieged couldn’t get out, were checked at any attempt as they would try to break out and to make sure that nothing could get in or out of the area, whether it were supplies, weapons, fighters, refugees, food or medicine. It basically came down to numbers, if you have to besiege a hundred fighting men you almost certainly need twice that number to keep them in there. As there were a few dozen rebel pockets across western Syria with several dozen fighters in each of them who were looking for a fight, the numbers quickly show that the Assad regime would be in trouble sooner than later. It would need an effective strategy to make sure that it could keep the opposition in check with as many men as possible while ceding as little territory as possible.

Thus began a truly ingenious part of warfare, the juggling of treaties and forces to keep a delicate balance while contact was established with the regime’s allies abroad. Whenever a crisis arose, the Assad regime was quick to announce a ceasefire in another part of the country for an amount of time that allowed government forces to redeploy and assist in ongoing operations there. This strategy was a vital part of the regime’s efforts and was used time and time again. Often terms were agreed upon which the regime would later not enforce, humanitarian convoys to rebel pockets were often stopped, delayed and even looted of some of its supplies. When the agreement was then dissolved and fighting resumed, the regime would already have troops in place to fight on. The rebel forces were too fragmented to counter the strategy. For most of the people in these pockets it must’ve been a relief to know that for a short amount of time no bullets and bombs would fly around them. One can only imagine how the situation on the ground could’ve been if the opposition would have declined the ceasefires and continued to keep the pressure on the regime’s forces.

Even now, with the numerous de-escalation zones implemented across Syria, I personally see mostly gains for the regime’s forces. It gives their forces precious time to regroup, rest, resupply and be trained to use better equipment sent by their international backers. It also allows them to secure vital territory in other parts of the country which strengthens the regime’s position during the peace talks.

 For the rebels though, it spell mostly doom. The opposition remains too divided to this day, moderates and more radical groups continue to bicker among themselves for territory and influence. In Idlib, which is considered by many the heart of the opposition movement in western Syria, clashes continue to break out between its prominent factions. A lull in the fighting is the worst thing that can happen to these undisciplined troops as they can no longer focus on the fight against the enemy and soon after they will begin to appreciate the calm and the lack of gunfire, they’ll begin to think of friends and family, or they’ll simply grow bored with the situation or each other.

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Syria: Why the Assad-coalition is not interested in peace as of yet

The Syrian Civil war might be an absolute nightmare in terms of destruction, casualties and political complexity but it would seem that the major players in the conflict have their own goals before they will make a genuine effort to bring an end to the fighting.

There have been some serious shifts in the balance of power during this conflict and at the moment it seems that all parties involved are taking a moment to consider their next big move in order to force a breakthrough. This article is aimed at giving an overview of the factions involved that have a lot to win and lose.

The Assad-coalition:

The Assad-regime

The Assad regime consists of mainly a Shia minority (and members from other ethno-religious communities who have proven their loyalty) in the government and the broad security and military apparatus that was established back in the 70s when Hafez al-Assad took power.

The Assad regime had to deal with numerous setbacks early on in the Syrian Uprising as thousands of men that were called upon to return to the barracks and take up arms against the rebels, refused to do so. They either joined the opposition groups or fled to neighbouring countries to avoid being drafted. What meagre forces that could be mustered had to be bolstered with patriotic and opportunistic men who joined the National Defence Forces and were given weapons to hold onto as much territory as possible while the regime’s elite units were rushing from one crisis to another. As much of the country’s wealth is in the hands of the privileged few, many chose to back the regime out of necessity and survival rather than duty since a defeat would result in the loss of all their assets in Syria. 

Its initial strategy to have a military presence in all corners of Syria in order to argue that it remains in control of its sovereign territory resulted in the Syrian Arab Forces being dispersed to a dangerous level. The regime was therefor forced to carefully pick and choose its battles to avoid losses that it could not replenish afterwards, or having to defend territory that it would not be able to hold. As the different opposition groups moved against Assad forces, it often came down to the commanders in the field to make the difference. For example, When Deir ez-Zour came under siege by the jihadists of the Islamic State and was under serious threat, republican guard general Issam Zahreddine was sent in to hold onto the city at all costs. His leadership skills and inspiring presence at the front lines helped the men under his command to hold onto the territory despite being under tremendous pressure. Another example is the commander of the now famous Tiger Forces, Suheil al-Hassan, his unwavering loyalty and leadership made him the ideal candidate to lead an elite unit that would be the deciding factor in numerous offensives across Syria, whether it was blocking an enemy offensive and reversing all their gains or spearheading an offensive.

Bashar al-Assad vowed to retake all of Syria many times and now, with the backing of powerful regional and global powers, it would seem that he is well on his way to do so. It seems unlikely that he will accept an agreement which would result in the division of Syrian territory or where he would be forced to share power with both moderates and the extremists. He is clearly set on taking every inch back and keep it in a tight grasp.

The true cost of the war, however, is something that might be impossible to predict at the moment. The regime has always claimed that its elaborate security apparatus was necessary to prevent extremist groups from gaining a foothold in Syria. At the moment al-Assad has managed to present himself as the defender of the Syrian people from the extremists and opportunists who would see an end to Syria if it were to serve their own goals. This had led to an increased popularity among the people, even among the people who became disillusioned with how the rebels' misconduct and mismanagement began to hurt the ideals of the Syrian Uprising. 

It could very well be that one of the causes for the Syrian Uprising could be enforced even harsher when the Assad regime regains control of Syria, leading to an all-out purge of any form of dissent against the regime. It is also unclear what kind of deals were made with its allies in exchange for the enormous amount of support in manpower, materials and logistics. It may very well be that in order for Syria's survival, al-Assad might have sold his soul and that of his country.

Hezbollah

Hezbollah has been very much dependant on the support it received from the Assad regime in terms of weapons, logistics, training and finances by acting as an access point for Iran to continue a strong presence in Lebanon and countering the Israeli influence there.

The fall of the Assad regime could have meant an end to this support as a government that looked more favourable towards the West and would not seek to continue to fund this terror organization, as designated by numerous western countries and regional allies. Hezbollah backing the Assad regime was there for a matter of survival, but of opportunity as well.

It was able to test its organization’s military capabilities by actively taking part in the fighting and launching offensives in a variety of combat zones across Syria. The experience it gained by doing this allowed the organization to boost its political presence in the region and more importantly, test out and adjust its tactics and strategies based on the successes it had in the field and send a clear signal to adversaries that it is still a force to be reckoned with.

Iran

Iran is one of the few countries that has actually managed to capitalize on the turmoil in the al-Sham region as has now more influence, both political and military, than (ever) before.

 It has (in)directly supported moves by the Shia communities to gain more political and military prominence in both theatres of war. In Iraq it was the main supporter for the Popular Mobilization Units that were eager to take the fight to ISIS forces when they were on the verge of breaking through to Baghdad. In Syria it was responsible for providing valuable strategic advice and supplementing elite Iranian forces to help turn the tide in several critical battles. One of Iran’s prominent generals and commander and of the al Quds force, Qasem Soleimani, has been Iran’s most valuable asset in the region as he was responsible for the most important offensives which Shia units launched successfully against both ISIS (in Iraq) and rebel forces (in Syria).

Iran aims to keep the Shia dominant minority in power at all costs as it has invested a lot of time and resources in the regime for its long-term strategic objectives in the region. It is there for more than likely that Iran will continue to support Assad in its efforts to regain control of the whole of Syria and therefor putting an end to the presence of western coalition forces in Syria. It has already begun its elaborate plan by launching an offensive in north-western Iraq with the help of PMU forces to gain control of an important military airbase to the south of Tal-Afar, which can be used as a launch point against future attacks across the Syrian-Iraqi border into northern Syria’s SDF territory, forcing them to fight on numerous fronts.

Iran is also moving on establishing closer ties with some of the nations in the Arabian Peninsula, which is basically its nemesis’ back yard. The Saudis have been fighting a war in Yemen for some time now and have little to show for it. Its forces have suffered embarrassing defeats at the hands of Yemeni fighters on the ground, but Saudi warplanes keep attacking Yemen’s populated areas resulting a high civilian casualties. The Saudis’ reputation has suffered internationally because of this.

Russia

Russia is the second country that managed to capitalize on the turmoil in the region as it has established itself as a prominent powerbroker in the regional theatre as well as on the international stage. Before that the country was basically ‘in the doghouse’.

Russia’s (for the most part) successful campaign has given Putin international prestige for acting decisively against international terror groups whereas the West was blamed for supporting the enemy of their enemy in order to get what they wanted, resulting in a loss of face and credibility as a major player in the conflict.

The war has also provided the Russian armed forces with a valuable opportunity to test their new equipment in a real battlefield and already suggestions for enhancements were made to make their equipment even more efficient in future warzones. It also saw the first Russian aircraft carrier of the Kuznetsov class perform in a theatre of war.

The participation in the Syrian Civil War has also provided Russia with a way to boost its economy as the new Russian hardware that is used on the battlefield, has attracted the attention of numerous would-be buyers, countries that before that were customers with western manufacturers. The cutting-edge technology and the battle performance of the newest Russian armoured vehicles and helicopters had a major impact on and off the battlefield.

Its alliance with the Syrian regime has also resulted in the agreement of having a permanent presence in the region as Russia will continue to have a military presence in the airbase and the naval base it currently uses, giving it a foothold in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea.

It is also very likely that Syria will become one of Russia’s most important trading partners in a post-conflict scenario as I think Russia will be one of the few suppliers of all the materials and hardware needed in the rebuilding effort. 





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Syria: How the Raqqa-offensive might backfire

For the past months the international media have been painting a pretty picture of the ongoing war against the Islamic State. The group’s territory and holdings have been significantly reduced thanks to the efforts of the international coalition. Several prominent players in the group’s organization were targeted and it became increasingly more difficult for the group to attract new recruits. The impressive flow of wealth the group once managed was also systematically targeted, which led to a great amount of fighters who became disgruntled by seeing their pay-outs reduced drastically.

More importantly is that the group’s core territory came under threat in both Syria and Iraq by the international coalition. In Iraq the Iraqi Army began its long-awaited offensive to liberate the Mosul, the largest and most important stronghold of the Islamic State in the country. In Syria the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) continue to capture more territory previously held by the terror group. Recently Tabqah was liberated and the river Euphrates was reached in several locations, isolating the city of Raqqa even more.

Although the goal is conquering Raqqa, there are still some important things to take into account. The SDF consists predominantly of Syrian Kurds who fight under the YPG-formation. This was set in motion in an attempt to defend their villages back when the Islamic State had the upper hand in the region, but it was through the Kurds’ determination, courage and sacrifices that the Islamic State suffered its first defeat at Kobanê and in other locations of the region. As the YPG continued to beat back the IS, more groups started to join the movement, and the the Syrian Democratic Forces fwas formed. As they continued to liberate more areas they set up local councils consisting of local dignitaries from the different ethnic-religious communities to govern the area together.

The SDF continues to receive more support from the United States which is something that its neighbouring country Turkey doesn’t like at all. Turkish president Erdoğan has repeatedly stated that this Kurdish faction has close ties with the Turkish-based PKK group. The fact that the SDF are receiving heavy weapons to support the push south is something that left the Turkish government fuming. The Turkish government doesn’t want to see an established zone of influence managed by Kurds on its southern border and is there for not too happy about how things are currently developing. It was because of this the Turkish government offered to take Raqqa with the FSA-rebel groups it supports.

This proposition was declined because of several reasons. These rebel groups’ battle performance wasn’t too impressive, which became painfully clear when these units tried to take the city of al-Bab from the Islamic State. After numerous setbacks Turkish forces were sent in to stop the bleeding but even then these forces suffered some embarrassing setbacks. Several of these rebel groups’ reputation had suffered as well when it was reported they used excessive violence. The fact that the Turkish progress in northern Syria was bottle-necked by both American and Russian intervention is something that Erdoğan doesn’t like at all. He clearly saw himself playing a more prominent role in this conflict and will look for new ways to insert himself once more the moment he sees his chance.

The biggest problem is that there is a certain aspect of the Raqqa-offensive that has been downplayed to a great extent, which is the humanitarian aspect. The international coalition hasn’t made any serious attempts at providing shelter, food and security for the people who are displaced because of the ongoing violence. Local sources reported for the urgent need for a better coordinated effort at a much larger scale. The administration of the Democratic Federation of northern Syria (Rojava) has become a safe haven for hundreds of thousands of people from all over Syria who were forced to flee. Recently more refugees came from Iraq’s Nineveh province when the offensive for Mosul was launched. It takes a consistent effort to shelter, feed and provide other necessary services to help these people. When thousands more will arrive because of the fighting in and around Raqqa, the situation might soon become a crisis.

The coalition doesn’t seem to have learnt any lessons from the offensive for Mosul, despite warnings from aid organisations who tried to manage the situation. It soon became clear that the prepared camps were filled to capacity and there were more people coming every day. The fight for Mosul has been going for eight months and there’s still thousands of people trapped in hostile territory, which will only lead to an even greater humanitarian catastrophe.

If we don’t want to see the same thing happening in Rojava, the SDF need to receive international humanitarian aid in order to prepare the necessary infrastructure , resources, and logistics before the offensive on Raqqa is launched. This would mean refugee camps for several hundreds of thousands of people, drinkable water, food, medicine and other means of support. These tasks have to be performed by people who are experienced in these matters which only stresses the need for more cooperation with aid organizations.

So far it looks like the international coalition, and the US in particular, are hell-bent on taking Raqqa as soon as possible. What they seem to forget is that the fight against the Islamic State is just one aspect of the conflict that is raging in Syria and that a well-established and coordinated humanitarian presence in this part of the war-torn country can play a vital role in achieving their operational goals. It could help in decreasing the amount of refugees seeking refuge in neighbouring countries, which would relieve some of the pressure on these regional partners. It could also help to set up additional de-escalation zones and could even strengthen the political position of these groups at the negotiation table, because so far the SDF weren’t invited to the table to take part in the peace process. If the humanitarian aspect of this offensive isn’t given some serious thought and the offensive starts without the necessary preparations, the SDF risks losing international political standing since it would look like they won't be able to support all these people. It could also provide the opportunity for the Assad-coalition or Turkey to open a new front and engulf this whole part of the country back into chaos.

The offensive for Raqqa has started and there is no doubt that the city will fall eventually. What the consequences will be in the long term for the SDF and the region is something time will only tell…



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If you have any questions, remarks or constructive feedback on the content or my writing, please do not hesitate to leave a comment. I would love to use this platform to interact with people to discuss topics like these and gain new perspectives and improve on my writing skills.

Note: this is an article that was written for a small editoral office in Brussels on a voluntary basis for the Kurdish Institute's bimonthly publication of The Kurds, issue n° 95, May-June 2017

the original Dutch version is also present on my blog)
URL: http://www.kurdishinstitute.be/de-keerzijde-van-het-raqqa-offensief-bart-rombouts/