Syria: Western backers at an important crossroads

After almost seven years of gruesome warfare and hundreds of thousands of casualties it would seem like the Syrian conflict is entering a new phase. The Assad-regime has succeeded in re-establishing control in large swathes of the country thanks to the support of its allies. The rhetoric and the calculated political moves the regime continues to make are worrying since it shows that there will be almost no room for a lasting political solution that involves the other factions. 

The rebels are too fractured

The Syrian population initially took to the streets against the Assad-regime with the hope that it would implement a number of reforms. The Syrian people had enough of the authoritarian government that mainly looked after a privileged elite while using a large security apparatus to stamp out any form of dissent. When the protests turned violent, civilians began to organize themselves in militias to protect their homes, neighbourhoods and villages against raiding parties of Assadists who came to intimidate protesters. They mostly  consisted of paramilitary loyalists who sensed an opportunity to loot people’s homes without repercussions. As the resistance against the Assad-regime began to consolidate these groups became more organized thanks to a lot of soldiers that defected in large numbers.

The fragile cooperation and the ideological divide between the different rebel groups became apparent when the numerous groups began to pursue their own agendas to draw more support from their foreign backers and begin to bicker among themselves to carve up territory that they would begin to govern as they seemed fit. Matters were made worse with the emergence of several jihadist groups that saw an opportunity to gain support and influence in the region by fighting an enemy everyone wanted gone. The momentum these groups had on the battlefield at one point was lost because of this lack of cohesion.

The lack of coordination, gains and the enormous amount of money that was poured into these groups for tactical training and weapons through their foreign backers led to the decision that these programs would be either scaled down or shut down completely. The U.S. was one of these backers, and now numerous moderate rebels are at risk of being dissolved or absorbed by radical groups. The de-escalation zones that were implemented across Syria emphasize the critical situation in which the rebels find themselves, as the lack of cohesion between the groups leads to infighting and a waste of resources that could be used against their common enemy.

When the Assad-regime will focus its resources on these fronts it is unlikely that these groups will be able to mount a coordinated and an effective defence against the now military superior Assad forces. There will be also little to no political intervention on their behalf by the international community because of their radical beliefs.

The Assad-coalition has the upper-hand

The Assad coalition has succeeded in gaining the upper-hand both militarily and politically in the Syrian conflict, in no small part thanks to the contributions of its allies, of which Iran and Russia both played a crucial role. This allows them to focus their resources on a specific front, targeting certain groups in particular and gain another strategic or political advantage over the other factions. It gives them more leverage during the negotiations that aim to end the fighting and find a political solution.

At the start of the conflict the regime found itself in increasingly more trouble as it began to lose more and more control of the country. It only seemed a matter of time before the regime would fall as the loyalists were unable to mount successful offensives with the limited resources they had across the country. The regime was forced to concentrate its resources in a few elite units that would rush to the most critical fronts while a defensive posture was implemented across other fronts. Assad loyalists began to dig in and fortify their military bases and neighbourhoods while the air force began to systematically destroy rebel-held territory with a variety of ordnance. Barrel bombs, thermobaric ordnance and even chemical weapons were used on a large scale, mostly against its civilian population. This in turn resulted in a regional and international refugee crisis as millions were forced to flee the country. During all this the Assad-regime continued to claim that it was in control of most of the country.

The support the regime received was at first not enough to turn the tide in their favour as the rebels received increasingly more (in)direct support from their foreign backers. Turkey, the United States, Israel  and several gulf states in particular realised that the removal of the Assad regime could be a very good thing. The increasing amount of Iranian troops and Russian hardware however allowed the Assad-regime to mount its first series of offensives in the western part of Syria, taking control of the Khanassar-route and reaching its beleaguered forces in Syria’s largest city of Aleppo. The Assad-regime also began to push back against the rebel forces around the capital of Damascus and Daraa, more to the south. Large scale counteroffensives mounted by rebel forces were blocked and ultimately defeated.

The regime also succeeds in conquering more territory as it negotiates the surrender of rebel pockets across Syria, offering them amnesty or the opportunity to relocate with their families to rebel-held territory. These negotiations are undertaken by the reconciliation centre under the supervision of the regime’s Russian allies. This allows the regime to divert more troops to other fronts, avoid casualties while consolidating the rebels in certain parts of the country.

Both Iran and Russia have a lot to gain if the Assad-regime were to be victorious. Iran can expand its political influence in the country and put more pressure on its regional adversaries, Israel in particular. Russia on the other hand now has a permanent military presence in the Eastern Mediterranean thanks to the bases under its control in Latakia province. It is also very likely that Syria will become Russia’s most profitable foreign market in the foreseeable future. The possibility of a trial and conviction of the regime and its leader is also very unlikely as Russia continues to protect both with its right of veto. This led to the resignation of the head of the committee that was looking into war crimes committed in Syria as Carla del Ponte was convinced that there was more than enough evidence to convict the regime but it would just not be possible because of Russian interference. The regime might survive this conflict but it would seem that it has sold its soul to its allies as the main reasons that led to the outbreak of the protests and the revolt are still not addressed.

It is very likely that the regime will return to doing the same things that it has always done, which is using the security apparatus to stamp out any form of dissent. There is also the possibility that the security forces in due time will use the footage that was created by rebel forces and shared through social media to identify would-be rebels, apprehend and imprison them. 

The caliphate collapses

The Islamic State is desperately clinging onto the territory that remains under their control in al-Sham. After the fall of Mosul and Tal-Afar in Iraq the terror group only hold territory around Hawija and the deserts near the Syrian border.

In Syria the caliphate is buckling under increasing pressure from all fronts as the capital of Raqqa is under attack by Syrian Democratic Forces and its front lines in central Syria were overrun by the Assad-coalition’s forces. This offensive was aimed at lifting the siege of Deir Ez-Zour where a loyalist garrison held of the jihadists for three years. Now that the core territory of the caliphate is overrun many of its fighters begin to lose heart and look for ways to escape capture and prosecution.

Despite all this, the terror group is far from defeated as their caliph, al-Baghdadi, has eluded capture so far despite numerous attempts to kill and/or capture him, along with several prominent members. In the future the group will return to the shadow organisation it was before, using terror attacks to undermine the regional governments and inflame sectarian tensions while rebuilding its strength, support and forging new alliances with other terror groups, among which possibly Al-Qaeda.

It is very likely that the group in due time will resurface in another part of the world, at the moment the caliphate has a foothold in the Philippines, Afghanistan and West-Africa. It is also plausible that the group will try to gain a foothold in regions where it can ignite new violence and draw on new supporters, for example in Central Asia, or even reignite tensions in post-war regions such as the Balkans, where there are still numerous conservative Muslim communities with radical influences and where the authorities hesitate to go, creating effective no-go zones.

Are the Syrian Democratic Forces our best bet for change?

One of the moderate groups in the Syrian conflict that managed to achieve solid results are the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) that aim for a decentralised political system that guarantees the political and cultural rights of the country’s numerous ethnic and religious minorities. The movement consists of Syrian Kurds, Arabs, Turkmen, Yezidis, Syriacs (to name only a few) but is at the moment dominated by the Syrian Kurds.

The group received the (in)direct support of several western countries in their struggle against the Islamic State, the U.S., the U.K., Germany and France all made contributions varying from logistical support, fire support, arms, training and even Special Operation Forces.

The Obama-administration tried to fight the Islamic State through its proxies as much as possible, trying to avoid a situation where the U.S. would be sent into another costly long-term conflict in the Middle East. As the fight against the Islamic State became more intense, there was a need for more support which resulted into an increase of American troops and hardware in the region.

The Trump administration was partially elected thanks to the rhetoric of then candidate Trump where he claimed on numerous occasions that he would bring the fight against the Islamic State into a higher gear by ‘bombing the shit out of them’.

It didn’t take long after president Trump was elected that there was a significant increase in American troops noticeable in Syria, partially to help support the long-awaited offensive on Raqqa. This higher gear sadly also lead to a noticeable increase in civilian casualties as the battles for Mosul and Raqqa intensified despite implementing procedures that were aimed at avoiding these kind of casualties in the first place.

More war or Cold war?

The question is what the United States’ strategic objectives will be once Raqqa falls and Deir Ez-Zour is within reach. The main focus will be on clearing out the last pockets that will be under the control of the Islamic State and tracking down as many of the leadership as possible before they have the chance to flee the region. It is also vital that the Syrian Democratic Forces consolidate their hold on the northern bank of the Euphrates river to avoid that the Assad-coalition gains a foothold there. Both the Assad-coalition and the SDF will become the two prominent factions in the Syrian conflict which means that they’ll have to come together and start negotiating at some point. The question is whether both parties are interested at this point to begin negotiations because their agendas are as far apart from one another as possible.

Bashar al-Assad has declared on numerous occasions that he intends to regain control of every inch of Syrian territory. Thanks to the support of Iran and Russia is very likely that he will succeed in this if the West does not make it clear to him that this is no longer a realistic scenario in a post-ISIS Syria. At the moment the SDF are in control of a significant part of Syria and thanks to recent successful offensives around the Euphrates, are now also in control of strategic civilian infrastructure like oil fields and dams. This could give them some political leverage during future negotiations. The problem is that the Assad-regime does not recognize the SDF as a political actor in the conflict, which could possible lead to a military confrontation.

It is also unclear where the Trump-administration stands as there have been some very contradicting statements in the past. Initially it looked like the U.S. were planning to continue to support the SDF in Syria while maintaining a presence in the region for several years. This was reported as incorrect as an official announcement stated that the U.S. would end its support to the SDF after the Islamic State was defeated. The Western military presence in Syria is also unofficial and not legal according to international laws. The Assad regime has never given the U.S. or any other western country the permission to build up a military presence within its borders. This is the case with both Iran and Russia, who were officially asked to intervene on behalf of the regime.

The U.S. has also lost a lot of partners in the region over the past years and is trying to keep some sort of influence in the region and its changing dynamics. The relationship with Turkey has hit a low point because the U.S. is providing broad support to an organization which Turkey regards as a terror organization and has opted out of working with Turkey and its proxies in the past. There is also the matter in which Turkey has been cracking down on its people after the failed coup attempt and has become increasingly more authoritarian, which led to criticism from several prominent leaders in the West, among which German chancellor Angela Merkel. Turkey is also displeased with the U.S. because it refuses to hand over the presumed leader of the failed coup who lives in exile in the States, even after ‘a considerable amount of evidence’ was provided to them.

There is also an increasing amount of Russian and Iranian influence noticeable in the region. The Iraqi government announced that it was looking into ways to cooperate more closely with Teheran in the future, while it also began to court several Gulf states which led to a diplomatic crisis and the blockade of Qatar. It is also speculated that Iran has been supporting the Houthi rebels in the Yemeni conflict who are fighting a Saudi-led coalition and have on several occasions embarrassed the Saudi forces with numerous victories.

Russia was awarded an important military contract in both Iraq and Egypt and has also sold it newest air-defence system, the S-400, to Turkey. Russia has also begun with re-establishing ties with Libya, which is still in turmoil after the fall of Gadhaffi.

The U.S. will try to counter these new spheres of influence by securing one of their own with the help of new regional partners. The Syrian and Iraqi Kurds could therefor prove vital for the American strategic objectives in the Middle East. In both regions the U.S. has announced several projects to help these groups with the rebuilding effort and possibly paving the way for an American military presence. The problem with this is that the U.S. will be creating new regional actors and will have to sustain them for a certain period of time. This is very much the case for the northern Syrian democratic federation that is literally surrounded on all sides by hostile governments.

It is very likely that the Assad-coalition is going to test whether the Trump administration is really willing to risk a direct confrontation by standing with the SDF when a battle-hardened force with serious hardware comes knocking. As I mentioned earlier the United States’ presence in the country is unlawful which could lead to an international diplomatic embarrassment when the Assad-coalition calls on the international community to make the U.S. withdraw from Syrian sovereign territory. There are also not enough western troops in Syria to be stationed along the frontlines to discourage the regime’s forces from trying anything and the West doesn’t have enough political capital to enforce a political solution. It also seems unlikely that the Trump administration will be willing to invest enormous amounts of money in the region to help the SDF in fighting the Assad-coalition. Trump famously criticized the previous administration for jumping into another regional conflict that would cost enormous amounts of money to achieve unrealistic objectives that were a waste of time.

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Syria: How the Raqqa-offensive might backfire

For the past months the international media have been painting a pretty picture of the ongoing war against the Islamic State. The group’s territory and holdings have been significantly reduced thanks to the efforts of the international coalition. Several prominent players in the group’s organization were targeted and it became increasingly more difficult for the group to attract new recruits. The impressive flow of wealth the group once managed was also systematically targeted, which led to a great amount of fighters who became disgruntled by seeing their pay-outs reduced drastically.

More importantly is that the group’s core territory came under threat in both Syria and Iraq by the international coalition. In Iraq the Iraqi Army began its long-awaited offensive to liberate the Mosul, the largest and most important stronghold of the Islamic State in the country. In Syria the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) continue to capture more territory previously held by the terror group. Recently Tabqah was liberated and the river Euphrates was reached in several locations, isolating the city of Raqqa even more.

Although the goal is conquering Raqqa, there are still some important things to take into account. The SDF consists predominantly of Syrian Kurds who fight under the YPG-formation. This was set in motion in an attempt to defend their villages back when the Islamic State had the upper hand in the region, but it was through the Kurds’ determination, courage and sacrifices that the Islamic State suffered its first defeat at Kobanê and in other locations of the region. As the YPG continued to beat back the IS, more groups started to join the movement, and the the Syrian Democratic Forces fwas formed. As they continued to liberate more areas they set up local councils consisting of local dignitaries from the different ethnic-religious communities to govern the area together.

The SDF continues to receive more support from the United States which is something that its neighbouring country Turkey doesn’t like at all. Turkish president Erdoğan has repeatedly stated that this Kurdish faction has close ties with the Turkish-based PKK group. The fact that the SDF are receiving heavy weapons to support the push south is something that left the Turkish government fuming. The Turkish government doesn’t want to see an established zone of influence managed by Kurds on its southern border and is there for not too happy about how things are currently developing. It was because of this the Turkish government offered to take Raqqa with the FSA-rebel groups it supports.

This proposition was declined because of several reasons. These rebel groups’ battle performance wasn’t too impressive, which became painfully clear when these units tried to take the city of al-Bab from the Islamic State. After numerous setbacks Turkish forces were sent in to stop the bleeding but even then these forces suffered some embarrassing setbacks. Several of these rebel groups’ reputation had suffered as well when it was reported they used excessive violence. The fact that the Turkish progress in northern Syria was bottle-necked by both American and Russian intervention is something that Erdoğan doesn’t like at all. He clearly saw himself playing a more prominent role in this conflict and will look for new ways to insert himself once more the moment he sees his chance.

The biggest problem is that there is a certain aspect of the Raqqa-offensive that has been downplayed to a great extent, which is the humanitarian aspect. The international coalition hasn’t made any serious attempts at providing shelter, food and security for the people who are displaced because of the ongoing violence. Local sources reported for the urgent need for a better coordinated effort at a much larger scale. The administration of the Democratic Federation of northern Syria (Rojava) has become a safe haven for hundreds of thousands of people from all over Syria who were forced to flee. Recently more refugees came from Iraq’s Nineveh province when the offensive for Mosul was launched. It takes a consistent effort to shelter, feed and provide other necessary services to help these people. When thousands more will arrive because of the fighting in and around Raqqa, the situation might soon become a crisis.

The coalition doesn’t seem to have learnt any lessons from the offensive for Mosul, despite warnings from aid organisations who tried to manage the situation. It soon became clear that the prepared camps were filled to capacity and there were more people coming every day. The fight for Mosul has been going for eight months and there’s still thousands of people trapped in hostile territory, which will only lead to an even greater humanitarian catastrophe.

If we don’t want to see the same thing happening in Rojava, the SDF need to receive international humanitarian aid in order to prepare the necessary infrastructure , resources, and logistics before the offensive on Raqqa is launched. This would mean refugee camps for several hundreds of thousands of people, drinkable water, food, medicine and other means of support. These tasks have to be performed by people who are experienced in these matters which only stresses the need for more cooperation with aid organizations.

So far it looks like the international coalition, and the US in particular, are hell-bent on taking Raqqa as soon as possible. What they seem to forget is that the fight against the Islamic State is just one aspect of the conflict that is raging in Syria and that a well-established and coordinated humanitarian presence in this part of the war-torn country can play a vital role in achieving their operational goals. It could help in decreasing the amount of refugees seeking refuge in neighbouring countries, which would relieve some of the pressure on these regional partners. It could also help to set up additional de-escalation zones and could even strengthen the political position of these groups at the negotiation table, because so far the SDF weren’t invited to the table to take part in the peace process. If the humanitarian aspect of this offensive isn’t given some serious thought and the offensive starts without the necessary preparations, the SDF risks losing international political standing since it would look like they won't be able to support all these people. It could also provide the opportunity for the Assad-coalition or Turkey to open a new front and engulf this whole part of the country back into chaos.

The offensive for Raqqa has started and there is no doubt that the city will fall eventually. What the consequences will be in the long term for the SDF and the region is something time will only tell…



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Note: this is an article that was written for a small editoral office in Brussels on a voluntary basis for the Kurdish Institute's bimonthly publication of The Kurds, issue n° 95, May-June 2017

the original Dutch version is also present on my blog)
URL: http://www.kurdishinstitute.be/de-keerzijde-van-het-raqqa-offensief-bart-rombouts/

Syrië: (DUTCH) De keerzijde van het Raqqa-offensief

De afgelopen maanden schetsten de internationale media een rooskleurig beeld van de strijd tegen de Islamitische Staat. Zo werd het territorium van de groepering bijna gehalveerd door de inspanningen van de internationale coalitie. Tevens werden verschillende sleutelfiguren van de organisatie uitgeschakeld en werd het aanzienlijk moeilijker voor de groepering om nieuwe rekruten aan te trekken. De indrukwekkende stroom aan inkomsten van de groepering werd ook systematisch drooggelegd, wat tot grote ontevredenheid leidde bij de militanten die tot kort daarvoor aanzienlijke sommen geld uitbetaald werden.

Belangrijker nog is dat het kerngebied van de terreurgroep in Syrië en Irak werd aangevallen door de internationale coalitie. In Irak begon het Iraakse leger het langverwachte offensief om Mosul, het grootste bolwerk van Islamitische Staat in Irak, te heroveren. In Syrië slagen de Syrische Democratische Strijdkrachten (SDF) erin successen te blijven boeken. Zo werd de strategische stad Tabqah kortgeleden nog veroverd op de terreurgroep en wisten ze ook op verschillende plaatsen de Eufraat te bereiken waardoor de stad Raqqa steeds meer geïsoleerd raakt.

Hoewel het einddoel ongetwijfeld de verovering van deze stad is, zijn er belangrijke kanttekeningen die hierbij vermeld moeten worden. De SDF bestaan voor een groot deel uit Koerden die onder de YPG-vlag strijden. Aanvankelijk streden zij vooral om hun dorpen en steden te beschermen toen IS nog de overhand in de regio had, maar het was dankzij hun vastberadenheid, moed en opoffering dat de terreurgroep de eerste zware nederlaag leed rond Kobanê en in andere delen van de regio. Naarmate de YPG meer terrein wonnen, begonnen meerdere groeperingen zich bij hen aan te sluiten, waardoor de koepelorganisatie SDF in het leven werd geroepen. In de verschillende bevrijde regio’s werden bestuursorganen opgericht bestaande uit lokale vertegenwoordigers uit de verschillende etnisch-religieuze gemeenschappen, om samen te besturen.

Dat de SDF steeds meer ondersteuning krijgen van de internationale coalitie, zint buurland Turkije helemaal niet. Zo hamerde de Turkse president Erdoğan erop dat de Koerdische afdeling van de SDF nauwe banden zou hebben met de PKK, hetgeen weerlegd werd door de groepering en de coalitie. Dat de SDF nu ook zware wapens krijgen van de Amerikanen om Raqqa te veroveren, deed de Turkse regering dan ook steigeren. De Turkse regering ziet de invloed van de Syrische Koerden in het Syrische conflict dan ook met lede ogen aan. Om die reden bood president Erdoğan dan ook een alternatief aan om Raqqa in te nemen, namelijk met behulp van Syrische rebellen die door Turkije gesteund worden.

Dit voorstel werd echter om verschillende redenen van de hand gedaan. Zo hadden de Turkse bondgenoten o.m. aanzienlijk meer moeite om hun doelstellingen te halen op het slagveld, hetgeen pijnlijk duidelijk werd toen deze eenheden de stad Al-Bab probeerden te veroveren op de Islamitische Staat. Zelfs met directe steun van Turkse eenheden leden deze nog problematische nederlagen. Daarnaast kwamen verschillende van deze Syrische eenheden in opspraak door het gebruik van buitensporig geweld. Het feit dat het Turkse voorstel van tafel geveegd werd en de Turkse invloedssfeer in Syrië nu ingedamd wordt door zowel Russisch als Amerikaans ingrijpen, zint president Erdoğan helemaal niet. Hij had namelijk een aanzienlijk grotere rol voor zichzelf weggelegd in dit conflict en zal dan ook niet aarzelen om zijn kans te grijpen zodra deze zich voordoet.

Het grootste probleem is echter dat een bepaald aspect van het offensief bijna niet aangekaart wordt, namelijk het humanitaire aspect. Tot op heden werden te weinig inspanningen geleverd door de internationale coalitie om de mensen die het geweld proberen te ontvluchten, te voorzien van onderdak en voedsel op een schaal die nodig is om in hun behoeften te voorzien. Verschillende bronnen in de regio maakten dan ook al melding van de nood aan gecoördineerde hulp op een grotere schaal. De administratie van de Democratische Federatie van Noord-Syrië (Rojava) verleent reeds geruime tijd onderdak aan honderdduizenden mensen die het geweld in andere delen van Syrië probeerden te ontvluchten. Recent zijn er ook nog vluchtelingen uit Irak bijgekomen, sinds het Iraakse leger het offensief voor Mosul inzette. Voor al deze mensen is er al een aanzienlijke stroom aan goederen nodig om in hun levensonderhoud te voorzien – als daar nog eens meer dan honderdduizend mensen bijkomen die de gevechten in en rond Raqqa gaan ontvluchten, kan de situatie snel onhoudbaar worden.

De coalitie lijkt op dit vlak geen lessen te hebben geleerd van wat het offensief in Mosul met zich heeft meebracht, ondanks de waarschuwingen van hulporganisaties die probeerden alles in goede banen te leiden. Het werd duidelijk dat de opvangkampen te snel volliepen en het werd een kwestie van dweilen met de kraan open. Ondertussen wordt er al bijna acht maanden gevochten in en rond Mosul en zitten er nog enkele honderdduizenden mensen vast in vijandig gebied, waardoor de humanitaire situatie in de nabije toekomst alleen maar zal verslechteren.

Als we niet willen dat hetzelfde zich voordoet in Rojava, moeten de SDF nu internationale steun krijgen om de nodige infrastructuur, middelen, materieel en logistiek op te bouwen voordat de aanval op Raqqa echt ingezet wordt. Dit zou neerkomen op tentenkampen voor ongeveer driehonderdduizend mensen, het voorzien van drinkbaar water, voedsel, medische en psychologische ondersteuning, en nog een hele resem andere dingen om de overgang iets of wat te vergemakkelijken. Deze taken moeten ook uitgevoerd worden door ervaren mensen en specialisten, waardoor de nood aan samenwerking met verschillende hulporganisaties alleen maar dringender wordt.

Het lijkt er steeds meer op dat de leden van de coalitie, en de VS in het bijzonder, erop uit zijn om Raqqa zo snel mogelijk in te nemen. Wat ze echter lijken te vergeten is dat de strijd tegen de Islamitische Staat maar één aspect is van het veelgelaagde conflict in de regio en dat een goed uitgebouwde humanitaire infrastructuur een cruciale rol kan spelen voor de operationele doelstellingen in de regio. Zo kan het helpen om de regionale vluchtelingenstroom aanzienlijk te verminderen, hetgeen de druk op de buurlanden zou verkleinen. Daarnaast kan het de deur openen voor het afbakenen van aanvullende de-escalatiezones en kan het de politieke positie van deze partijen in het vredesproces versterken, want tot op heden werden de SDF niet uitgenodigd aan de onderhandelingstafel.

Indien het humanitaire aspect niet aangekaart wordt en het offensief op Raqqa ingezet wordt zonder dat de nodige voorbereidingen worden getroffen, lopen de SDF de kans om internationaal krediet te verliezen, doordat ze niet zullen kunnen voorzien in de noden van deze mensen. Daarnaast zou het als een potentieel motief gebruikt kunnen worden door zowel het Assad-regime als Turkije om in de toekomst nieuwe stappen te zetten om de bevrijde regio’s terug in chaos te storten.

Ondertussen is het offensief op Raqqa van start gegaan en er bestaat geen twijfel over dat de stad vroeg of laat zal vallen. Wat de gevolgen op lange termijn echter zullen zijn voor de regio en de SDF, zal de toekomst moeten uitwijzen.

Opmerking: Dit artikel verscheen in het magazine van het Koerdisch Instituut: De Koerden
(Jaargang 17, n°95, mei-juni 2017)
URL: http://www.kurdishinstitute.be/de-keerzijde-van-het-raqqa-offensief-bart-rombouts/