Syria: Western backers at an important crossroads

After almost seven years of gruesome warfare and hundreds of thousands of casualties it would seem like the Syrian conflict is entering a new phase. The Assad-regime has succeeded in re-establishing control in large swathes of the country thanks to the support of its allies. The rhetoric and the calculated political moves the regime continues to make are worrying since it shows that there will be almost no room for a lasting political solution that involves the other factions. 

The rebels are too fractured

The Syrian population initially took to the streets against the Assad-regime with the hope that it would implement a number of reforms. The Syrian people had enough of the authoritarian government that mainly looked after a privileged elite while using a large security apparatus to stamp out any form of dissent. When the protests turned violent, civilians began to organize themselves in militias to protect their homes, neighbourhoods and villages against raiding parties of Assadists who came to intimidate protesters. They mostly  consisted of paramilitary loyalists who sensed an opportunity to loot people’s homes without repercussions. As the resistance against the Assad-regime began to consolidate these groups became more organized thanks to a lot of soldiers that defected in large numbers.

The fragile cooperation and the ideological divide between the different rebel groups became apparent when the numerous groups began to pursue their own agendas to draw more support from their foreign backers and begin to bicker among themselves to carve up territory that they would begin to govern as they seemed fit. Matters were made worse with the emergence of several jihadist groups that saw an opportunity to gain support and influence in the region by fighting an enemy everyone wanted gone. The momentum these groups had on the battlefield at one point was lost because of this lack of cohesion.

The lack of coordination, gains and the enormous amount of money that was poured into these groups for tactical training and weapons through their foreign backers led to the decision that these programs would be either scaled down or shut down completely. The U.S. was one of these backers, and now numerous moderate rebels are at risk of being dissolved or absorbed by radical groups. The de-escalation zones that were implemented across Syria emphasize the critical situation in which the rebels find themselves, as the lack of cohesion between the groups leads to infighting and a waste of resources that could be used against their common enemy.

When the Assad-regime will focus its resources on these fronts it is unlikely that these groups will be able to mount a coordinated and an effective defence against the now military superior Assad forces. There will be also little to no political intervention on their behalf by the international community because of their radical beliefs.

The Assad-coalition has the upper-hand

The Assad coalition has succeeded in gaining the upper-hand both militarily and politically in the Syrian conflict, in no small part thanks to the contributions of its allies, of which Iran and Russia both played a crucial role. This allows them to focus their resources on a specific front, targeting certain groups in particular and gain another strategic or political advantage over the other factions. It gives them more leverage during the negotiations that aim to end the fighting and find a political solution.

At the start of the conflict the regime found itself in increasingly more trouble as it began to lose more and more control of the country. It only seemed a matter of time before the regime would fall as the loyalists were unable to mount successful offensives with the limited resources they had across the country. The regime was forced to concentrate its resources in a few elite units that would rush to the most critical fronts while a defensive posture was implemented across other fronts. Assad loyalists began to dig in and fortify their military bases and neighbourhoods while the air force began to systematically destroy rebel-held territory with a variety of ordnance. Barrel bombs, thermobaric ordnance and even chemical weapons were used on a large scale, mostly against its civilian population. This in turn resulted in a regional and international refugee crisis as millions were forced to flee the country. During all this the Assad-regime continued to claim that it was in control of most of the country.

The support the regime received was at first not enough to turn the tide in their favour as the rebels received increasingly more (in)direct support from their foreign backers. Turkey, the United States, Israel  and several gulf states in particular realised that the removal of the Assad regime could be a very good thing. The increasing amount of Iranian troops and Russian hardware however allowed the Assad-regime to mount its first series of offensives in the western part of Syria, taking control of the Khanassar-route and reaching its beleaguered forces in Syria’s largest city of Aleppo. The Assad-regime also began to push back against the rebel forces around the capital of Damascus and Daraa, more to the south. Large scale counteroffensives mounted by rebel forces were blocked and ultimately defeated.

The regime also succeeds in conquering more territory as it negotiates the surrender of rebel pockets across Syria, offering them amnesty or the opportunity to relocate with their families to rebel-held territory. These negotiations are undertaken by the reconciliation centre under the supervision of the regime’s Russian allies. This allows the regime to divert more troops to other fronts, avoid casualties while consolidating the rebels in certain parts of the country.

Both Iran and Russia have a lot to gain if the Assad-regime were to be victorious. Iran can expand its political influence in the country and put more pressure on its regional adversaries, Israel in particular. Russia on the other hand now has a permanent military presence in the Eastern Mediterranean thanks to the bases under its control in Latakia province. It is also very likely that Syria will become Russia’s most profitable foreign market in the foreseeable future. The possibility of a trial and conviction of the regime and its leader is also very unlikely as Russia continues to protect both with its right of veto. This led to the resignation of the head of the committee that was looking into war crimes committed in Syria as Carla del Ponte was convinced that there was more than enough evidence to convict the regime but it would just not be possible because of Russian interference. The regime might survive this conflict but it would seem that it has sold its soul to its allies as the main reasons that led to the outbreak of the protests and the revolt are still not addressed.

It is very likely that the regime will return to doing the same things that it has always done, which is using the security apparatus to stamp out any form of dissent. There is also the possibility that the security forces in due time will use the footage that was created by rebel forces and shared through social media to identify would-be rebels, apprehend and imprison them. 

The caliphate collapses

The Islamic State is desperately clinging onto the territory that remains under their control in al-Sham. After the fall of Mosul and Tal-Afar in Iraq the terror group only hold territory around Hawija and the deserts near the Syrian border.

In Syria the caliphate is buckling under increasing pressure from all fronts as the capital of Raqqa is under attack by Syrian Democratic Forces and its front lines in central Syria were overrun by the Assad-coalition’s forces. This offensive was aimed at lifting the siege of Deir Ez-Zour where a loyalist garrison held of the jihadists for three years. Now that the core territory of the caliphate is overrun many of its fighters begin to lose heart and look for ways to escape capture and prosecution.

Despite all this, the terror group is far from defeated as their caliph, al-Baghdadi, has eluded capture so far despite numerous attempts to kill and/or capture him, along with several prominent members. In the future the group will return to the shadow organisation it was before, using terror attacks to undermine the regional governments and inflame sectarian tensions while rebuilding its strength, support and forging new alliances with other terror groups, among which possibly Al-Qaeda.

It is very likely that the group in due time will resurface in another part of the world, at the moment the caliphate has a foothold in the Philippines, Afghanistan and West-Africa. It is also plausible that the group will try to gain a foothold in regions where it can ignite new violence and draw on new supporters, for example in Central Asia, or even reignite tensions in post-war regions such as the Balkans, where there are still numerous conservative Muslim communities with radical influences and where the authorities hesitate to go, creating effective no-go zones.

Are the Syrian Democratic Forces our best bet for change?

One of the moderate groups in the Syrian conflict that managed to achieve solid results are the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) that aim for a decentralised political system that guarantees the political and cultural rights of the country’s numerous ethnic and religious minorities. The movement consists of Syrian Kurds, Arabs, Turkmen, Yezidis, Syriacs (to name only a few) but is at the moment dominated by the Syrian Kurds.

The group received the (in)direct support of several western countries in their struggle against the Islamic State, the U.S., the U.K., Germany and France all made contributions varying from logistical support, fire support, arms, training and even Special Operation Forces.

The Obama-administration tried to fight the Islamic State through its proxies as much as possible, trying to avoid a situation where the U.S. would be sent into another costly long-term conflict in the Middle East. As the fight against the Islamic State became more intense, there was a need for more support which resulted into an increase of American troops and hardware in the region.

The Trump administration was partially elected thanks to the rhetoric of then candidate Trump where he claimed on numerous occasions that he would bring the fight against the Islamic State into a higher gear by ‘bombing the shit out of them’.

It didn’t take long after president Trump was elected that there was a significant increase in American troops noticeable in Syria, partially to help support the long-awaited offensive on Raqqa. This higher gear sadly also lead to a noticeable increase in civilian casualties as the battles for Mosul and Raqqa intensified despite implementing procedures that were aimed at avoiding these kind of casualties in the first place.

More war or Cold war?

The question is what the United States’ strategic objectives will be once Raqqa falls and Deir Ez-Zour is within reach. The main focus will be on clearing out the last pockets that will be under the control of the Islamic State and tracking down as many of the leadership as possible before they have the chance to flee the region. It is also vital that the Syrian Democratic Forces consolidate their hold on the northern bank of the Euphrates river to avoid that the Assad-coalition gains a foothold there. Both the Assad-coalition and the SDF will become the two prominent factions in the Syrian conflict which means that they’ll have to come together and start negotiating at some point. The question is whether both parties are interested at this point to begin negotiations because their agendas are as far apart from one another as possible.

Bashar al-Assad has declared on numerous occasions that he intends to regain control of every inch of Syrian territory. Thanks to the support of Iran and Russia is very likely that he will succeed in this if the West does not make it clear to him that this is no longer a realistic scenario in a post-ISIS Syria. At the moment the SDF are in control of a significant part of Syria and thanks to recent successful offensives around the Euphrates, are now also in control of strategic civilian infrastructure like oil fields and dams. This could give them some political leverage during future negotiations. The problem is that the Assad-regime does not recognize the SDF as a political actor in the conflict, which could possible lead to a military confrontation.

It is also unclear where the Trump-administration stands as there have been some very contradicting statements in the past. Initially it looked like the U.S. were planning to continue to support the SDF in Syria while maintaining a presence in the region for several years. This was reported as incorrect as an official announcement stated that the U.S. would end its support to the SDF after the Islamic State was defeated. The Western military presence in Syria is also unofficial and not legal according to international laws. The Assad regime has never given the U.S. or any other western country the permission to build up a military presence within its borders. This is the case with both Iran and Russia, who were officially asked to intervene on behalf of the regime.

The U.S. has also lost a lot of partners in the region over the past years and is trying to keep some sort of influence in the region and its changing dynamics. The relationship with Turkey has hit a low point because the U.S. is providing broad support to an organization which Turkey regards as a terror organization and has opted out of working with Turkey and its proxies in the past. There is also the matter in which Turkey has been cracking down on its people after the failed coup attempt and has become increasingly more authoritarian, which led to criticism from several prominent leaders in the West, among which German chancellor Angela Merkel. Turkey is also displeased with the U.S. because it refuses to hand over the presumed leader of the failed coup who lives in exile in the States, even after ‘a considerable amount of evidence’ was provided to them.

There is also an increasing amount of Russian and Iranian influence noticeable in the region. The Iraqi government announced that it was looking into ways to cooperate more closely with Teheran in the future, while it also began to court several Gulf states which led to a diplomatic crisis and the blockade of Qatar. It is also speculated that Iran has been supporting the Houthi rebels in the Yemeni conflict who are fighting a Saudi-led coalition and have on several occasions embarrassed the Saudi forces with numerous victories.

Russia was awarded an important military contract in both Iraq and Egypt and has also sold it newest air-defence system, the S-400, to Turkey. Russia has also begun with re-establishing ties with Libya, which is still in turmoil after the fall of Gadhaffi.

The U.S. will try to counter these new spheres of influence by securing one of their own with the help of new regional partners. The Syrian and Iraqi Kurds could therefor prove vital for the American strategic objectives in the Middle East. In both regions the U.S. has announced several projects to help these groups with the rebuilding effort and possibly paving the way for an American military presence. The problem with this is that the U.S. will be creating new regional actors and will have to sustain them for a certain period of time. This is very much the case for the northern Syrian democratic federation that is literally surrounded on all sides by hostile governments.

It is very likely that the Assad-coalition is going to test whether the Trump administration is really willing to risk a direct confrontation by standing with the SDF when a battle-hardened force with serious hardware comes knocking. As I mentioned earlier the United States’ presence in the country is unlawful which could lead to an international diplomatic embarrassment when the Assad-coalition calls on the international community to make the U.S. withdraw from Syrian sovereign territory. There are also not enough western troops in Syria to be stationed along the frontlines to discourage the regime’s forces from trying anything and the West doesn’t have enough political capital to enforce a political solution. It also seems unlikely that the Trump administration will be willing to invest enormous amounts of money in the region to help the SDF in fighting the Assad-coalition. Trump famously criticized the previous administration for jumping into another regional conflict that would cost enormous amounts of money to achieve unrealistic objectives that were a waste of time.

===
If you have any constructive feedback on my writing skills or the content that is published here, feel free to leave me a comment so that I can improve my skills.

Lebanon Refugee Crisis: the next possible hotspot in the Middle East?

Lebanon’s prime minister al-Hariri stated that his country urgently needed more international help in order to provide for the 1,5 million Syrian refugees that are currently living there.

Almost seven years into the Syrian conflict the number of refugees continue to be a major cause for concern for the region and the international community. More than 5 million Syrians have fled the country and are living in camps across the region, with around 3 million Syrian refugees living in camps in Turkey, 1,5 million in Lebanon and the remainder living in Jordan, (southern) Iraq and Egypt or moving even further away in an attempt to reach Europe and the US.

Adding to this, around 6 million Syrians are currently displaced inside Syria, living in areas under control of the different factions . This number is truly astounding when the population of Syria had been estimated to around 17 million people in 2014. This would mean that almost two-thirds(!) of the Syrian population are currently (in)directly forcibly displaced by the ongoing conflict.

Hosting and providing for the refugees in Lebanon hasn’t been an easy task. Lebanon has been trying to deal with a slowing economic growth and numerous other domestic problems, but at the moment the population of Lebanon has increased by twenty-five percent only through the refugee influx, which has put a tremendous strain on available resources and services. Although the situation hasn’t gotten out of hand up until now, the atmosphere is definitely changing.

Lebanese people are growing tired of the continuous presence of Syrians in the streets, looking to sell anything they can or offering themselves for low-paying labour jobs. They also believe that the government is currently doing more for them than their own people. This could potentially become a very dangerous situation when the necessary international aid does not arrive in the needed quantities to start supporting the Lebanese government and relieve the tension in its society. An example of this is when a short while ago two separate incidents occurred in the camps where fires broke out and dozens of tents, along with all the people’s belongings went up in flames. Several people, among which children, were severely injured. The incidents were classified as unfortunate accidents due to a technical malfunction of hardware. Thanks to humanitarian organisations operating in the country efforts were made to rebuild the necessary number of tents to help the people affected by the disaster.

People could easily start taking matters into their own hands when the situation is not properly addressed by the Lebanese government and the international community. Targeted assaults, forced entry into the camps and arson are only a few things that come to mind of what could happen… What is even worse, an escalation or lack of initiative could reignite the sectarian violence that has cast a shadow over the country’s recent history and to this day hasn’t been truly settled.

When Lebanon was under colonial rule after the Great War, the Maronite Christian community had a strong working relationship with the French and gradually became the dominant faction in politics after its independence in the 1940s. During the Cold War several Arab groups were inspired by the ideas of socialism and pan-Arab ideologies which led to an increasing polarized society. When clashes broke out in 1975 these Arab groups were (in-directly supported by the Soviet-Union(’s allies in the region) while the Christian communities were supported leaned towards the West. It didn’t take long before Syria and Israel joined the fray and the US (as part of their Cold War’s containment policy) became indirectly involved.

In the 1980s Israel invaded Lebanon to stamp out insurgents that were attacking from there and an international force had to be sent to intervene. It was only in 1990 that hostilities officially came to an end through the Taif Agreement but to this day tensions are high, clashes are frequent in several parts of the country between communities and parts of the Taif Agreement haven’t been implemented or followed. 

= = = = = = = = 

If you have any questions, remarks or constructive feedback on the content or my writing, please do not hesitate to leave a comment. I would love to use this platform to interact with people to discuss topics like these and gain new perspectives and improve on my writing skills.

Syria: Ceasefires are an effective part of the Assad-coalition’s strategy

When the Syrian Uprising escalated into nation-wide violence and numerous groups were formed to protect their communities and fight the Assad government, momentum was on the opposition’s side as it didn’t take long before Assad loyalists were starting to lose control of large territories and were ousted from numerous cities across the country.

The Syrian Arab Army’s initial strategy was to keep a force in all corners of Syria to be able to hold onto the claim that the regime had not lost control of the country. There was still an SAA presence in the cities of Aleppo, Qamishli, Hasakah, Deir ez-Zour and Daraa although the majority of these cities were under the control of rebel groups as well as a large part of the surrounding countryside.

It was in the western part of the country that numerous pockets of rebel hold-outs began to form. The Assad loyalists began to besiege this pockets to avoid them from linking up with one another, defeat them quickly if the opportunity should arise or just force them to surrender by either bombing or starving them into submission. This tactic seemed to work as these fronts remained mostly static and could there for be manned by less experienced troops while the heavy lifting would be done by the air force and time itself…

The Syrian Arab Army had to prioritize its military efforts as it had to fight off rebel offensives on numerous fronts and it was struggling to keep all the fronts manned effectively. In Syria every man of fighting age has to serve several years in the armed forces and it could in theory gather an effective fighting force in a short amount of time. The problem was that many men refused to answer the call to arms to fight for the regime and joined the opposition or fled the country to avoid being conscripted and forced to fight. There were also numerous defections of servicemen among all branches and ranks that joined the opposition in their struggle against the regime. This resulted in a depleted fighting force on which the Assad regime had to rely to do the fighting. It could count on its most elite units of the republican guard, composed of mostly Shia men, to fight fanatically for the survival of the regime as well. But there was still a need for more men and therefor patriots, opportunists and those willing to fight for fame and loot were organised into units as National Defence Forces. Efforts were also made to attract and organize additional paramilitary forces that would be willing to fight for the regime, among which the Lebanese Hezbollah paramilitary and the Palestinian paramilitary group. But it still wasn’t enough as Assad forces were still too spread thin.

To effectively besiege this numerous pockets, a lot of preparation logistics and manpower was needed to make sure that those who were besieged couldn’t get out, were checked at any attempt as they would try to break out and to make sure that nothing could get in or out of the area, whether it were supplies, weapons, fighters, refugees, food or medicine. It basically came down to numbers, if you have to besiege a hundred fighting men you almost certainly need twice that number to keep them in there. As there were a few dozen rebel pockets across western Syria with several dozen fighters in each of them who were looking for a fight, the numbers quickly show that the Assad regime would be in trouble sooner than later. It would need an effective strategy to make sure that it could keep the opposition in check with as many men as possible while ceding as little territory as possible.

Thus began a truly ingenious part of warfare, the juggling of treaties and forces to keep a delicate balance while contact was established with the regime’s allies abroad. Whenever a crisis arose, the Assad regime was quick to announce a ceasefire in another part of the country for an amount of time that allowed government forces to redeploy and assist in ongoing operations there. This strategy was a vital part of the regime’s efforts and was used time and time again. Often terms were agreed upon which the regime would later not enforce, humanitarian convoys to rebel pockets were often stopped, delayed and even looted of some of its supplies. When the agreement was then dissolved and fighting resumed, the regime would already have troops in place to fight on. The rebel forces were too fragmented to counter the strategy. For most of the people in these pockets it must’ve been a relief to know that for a short amount of time no bullets and bombs would fly around them. One can only imagine how the situation on the ground could’ve been if the opposition would have declined the ceasefires and continued to keep the pressure on the regime’s forces.

Even now, with the numerous de-escalation zones implemented across Syria, I personally see mostly gains for the regime’s forces. It gives their forces precious time to regroup, rest, resupply and be trained to use better equipment sent by their international backers. It also allows them to secure vital territory in other parts of the country which strengthens the regime’s position during the peace talks.

 For the rebels though, it spell mostly doom. The opposition remains too divided to this day, moderates and more radical groups continue to bicker among themselves for territory and influence. In Idlib, which is considered by many the heart of the opposition movement in western Syria, clashes continue to break out between its prominent factions. A lull in the fighting is the worst thing that can happen to these undisciplined troops as they can no longer focus on the fight against the enemy and soon after they will begin to appreciate the calm and the lack of gunfire, they’ll begin to think of friends and family, or they’ll simply grow bored with the situation or each other.

= = = = = = = = 

If you have any questions, remarks or constructive feedback on the content or my writing, please do not hesitate to leave a comment. I would love to use this platform to interact with people to discuss topics like these and gain new perspectives and improve on my writing skills.

Syria: Why the Assad-coalition is not interested in peace as of yet

The Syrian Civil war might be an absolute nightmare in terms of destruction, casualties and political complexity but it would seem that the major players in the conflict have their own goals before they will make a genuine effort to bring an end to the fighting.

There have been some serious shifts in the balance of power during this conflict and at the moment it seems that all parties involved are taking a moment to consider their next big move in order to force a breakthrough. This article is aimed at giving an overview of the factions involved that have a lot to win and lose.

The Assad-coalition:

The Assad-regime

The Assad regime consists of mainly a Shia minority (and members from other ethno-religious communities who have proven their loyalty) in the government and the broad security and military apparatus that was established back in the 70s when Hafez al-Assad took power.

The Assad regime had to deal with numerous setbacks early on in the Syrian Uprising as thousands of men that were called upon to return to the barracks and take up arms against the rebels, refused to do so. They either joined the opposition groups or fled to neighbouring countries to avoid being drafted. What meagre forces that could be mustered had to be bolstered with patriotic and opportunistic men who joined the National Defence Forces and were given weapons to hold onto as much territory as possible while the regime’s elite units were rushing from one crisis to another. As much of the country’s wealth is in the hands of the privileged few, many chose to back the regime out of necessity and survival rather than duty since a defeat would result in the loss of all their assets in Syria. 

Its initial strategy to have a military presence in all corners of Syria in order to argue that it remains in control of its sovereign territory resulted in the Syrian Arab Forces being dispersed to a dangerous level. The regime was therefor forced to carefully pick and choose its battles to avoid losses that it could not replenish afterwards, or having to defend territory that it would not be able to hold. As the different opposition groups moved against Assad forces, it often came down to the commanders in the field to make the difference. For example, When Deir ez-Zour came under siege by the jihadists of the Islamic State and was under serious threat, republican guard general Issam Zahreddine was sent in to hold onto the city at all costs. His leadership skills and inspiring presence at the front lines helped the men under his command to hold onto the territory despite being under tremendous pressure. Another example is the commander of the now famous Tiger Forces, Suheil al-Hassan, his unwavering loyalty and leadership made him the ideal candidate to lead an elite unit that would be the deciding factor in numerous offensives across Syria, whether it was blocking an enemy offensive and reversing all their gains or spearheading an offensive.

Bashar al-Assad vowed to retake all of Syria many times and now, with the backing of powerful regional and global powers, it would seem that he is well on his way to do so. It seems unlikely that he will accept an agreement which would result in the division of Syrian territory or where he would be forced to share power with both moderates and the extremists. He is clearly set on taking every inch back and keep it in a tight grasp.

The true cost of the war, however, is something that might be impossible to predict at the moment. The regime has always claimed that its elaborate security apparatus was necessary to prevent extremist groups from gaining a foothold in Syria. At the moment al-Assad has managed to present himself as the defender of the Syrian people from the extremists and opportunists who would see an end to Syria if it were to serve their own goals. This had led to an increased popularity among the people, even among the people who became disillusioned with how the rebels' misconduct and mismanagement began to hurt the ideals of the Syrian Uprising. 

It could very well be that one of the causes for the Syrian Uprising could be enforced even harsher when the Assad regime regains control of Syria, leading to an all-out purge of any form of dissent against the regime. It is also unclear what kind of deals were made with its allies in exchange for the enormous amount of support in manpower, materials and logistics. It may very well be that in order for Syria's survival, al-Assad might have sold his soul and that of his country.

Hezbollah

Hezbollah has been very much dependant on the support it received from the Assad regime in terms of weapons, logistics, training and finances by acting as an access point for Iran to continue a strong presence in Lebanon and countering the Israeli influence there.

The fall of the Assad regime could have meant an end to this support as a government that looked more favourable towards the West and would not seek to continue to fund this terror organization, as designated by numerous western countries and regional allies. Hezbollah backing the Assad regime was there for a matter of survival, but of opportunity as well.

It was able to test its organization’s military capabilities by actively taking part in the fighting and launching offensives in a variety of combat zones across Syria. The experience it gained by doing this allowed the organization to boost its political presence in the region and more importantly, test out and adjust its tactics and strategies based on the successes it had in the field and send a clear signal to adversaries that it is still a force to be reckoned with.

Iran

Iran is one of the few countries that has actually managed to capitalize on the turmoil in the al-Sham region as has now more influence, both political and military, than (ever) before.

 It has (in)directly supported moves by the Shia communities to gain more political and military prominence in both theatres of war. In Iraq it was the main supporter for the Popular Mobilization Units that were eager to take the fight to ISIS forces when they were on the verge of breaking through to Baghdad. In Syria it was responsible for providing valuable strategic advice and supplementing elite Iranian forces to help turn the tide in several critical battles. One of Iran’s prominent generals and commander and of the al Quds force, Qasem Soleimani, has been Iran’s most valuable asset in the region as he was responsible for the most important offensives which Shia units launched successfully against both ISIS (in Iraq) and rebel forces (in Syria).

Iran aims to keep the Shia dominant minority in power at all costs as it has invested a lot of time and resources in the regime for its long-term strategic objectives in the region. It is there for more than likely that Iran will continue to support Assad in its efforts to regain control of the whole of Syria and therefor putting an end to the presence of western coalition forces in Syria. It has already begun its elaborate plan by launching an offensive in north-western Iraq with the help of PMU forces to gain control of an important military airbase to the south of Tal-Afar, which can be used as a launch point against future attacks across the Syrian-Iraqi border into northern Syria’s SDF territory, forcing them to fight on numerous fronts.

Iran is also moving on establishing closer ties with some of the nations in the Arabian Peninsula, which is basically its nemesis’ back yard. The Saudis have been fighting a war in Yemen for some time now and have little to show for it. Its forces have suffered embarrassing defeats at the hands of Yemeni fighters on the ground, but Saudi warplanes keep attacking Yemen’s populated areas resulting a high civilian casualties. The Saudis’ reputation has suffered internationally because of this.

Russia

Russia is the second country that managed to capitalize on the turmoil in the region as it has established itself as a prominent powerbroker in the regional theatre as well as on the international stage. Before that the country was basically ‘in the doghouse’.

Russia’s (for the most part) successful campaign has given Putin international prestige for acting decisively against international terror groups whereas the West was blamed for supporting the enemy of their enemy in order to get what they wanted, resulting in a loss of face and credibility as a major player in the conflict.

The war has also provided the Russian armed forces with a valuable opportunity to test their new equipment in a real battlefield and already suggestions for enhancements were made to make their equipment even more efficient in future warzones. It also saw the first Russian aircraft carrier of the Kuznetsov class perform in a theatre of war.

The participation in the Syrian Civil War has also provided Russia with a way to boost its economy as the new Russian hardware that is used on the battlefield, has attracted the attention of numerous would-be buyers, countries that before that were customers with western manufacturers. The cutting-edge technology and the battle performance of the newest Russian armoured vehicles and helicopters had a major impact on and off the battlefield.

Its alliance with the Syrian regime has also resulted in the agreement of having a permanent presence in the region as Russia will continue to have a military presence in the airbase and the naval base it currently uses, giving it a foothold in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea.

It is also very likely that Syria will become one of Russia’s most important trading partners in a post-conflict scenario as I think Russia will be one of the few suppliers of all the materials and hardware needed in the rebuilding effort. 





= = = = = = = = 

If you have any questions, remarks or constructive feedback on the content or my writing, please do not hesitate to leave a comment. I would love to use this platform to interact with people to discuss topics like these and gain new perspectives and improve on my writing skills.

Syria: How the Raqqa-offensive might backfire

For the past months the international media have been painting a pretty picture of the ongoing war against the Islamic State. The group’s territory and holdings have been significantly reduced thanks to the efforts of the international coalition. Several prominent players in the group’s organization were targeted and it became increasingly more difficult for the group to attract new recruits. The impressive flow of wealth the group once managed was also systematically targeted, which led to a great amount of fighters who became disgruntled by seeing their pay-outs reduced drastically.

More importantly is that the group’s core territory came under threat in both Syria and Iraq by the international coalition. In Iraq the Iraqi Army began its long-awaited offensive to liberate the Mosul, the largest and most important stronghold of the Islamic State in the country. In Syria the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) continue to capture more territory previously held by the terror group. Recently Tabqah was liberated and the river Euphrates was reached in several locations, isolating the city of Raqqa even more.

Although the goal is conquering Raqqa, there are still some important things to take into account. The SDF consists predominantly of Syrian Kurds who fight under the YPG-formation. This was set in motion in an attempt to defend their villages back when the Islamic State had the upper hand in the region, but it was through the Kurds’ determination, courage and sacrifices that the Islamic State suffered its first defeat at Kobanê and in other locations of the region. As the YPG continued to beat back the IS, more groups started to join the movement, and the the Syrian Democratic Forces fwas formed. As they continued to liberate more areas they set up local councils consisting of local dignitaries from the different ethnic-religious communities to govern the area together.

The SDF continues to receive more support from the United States which is something that its neighbouring country Turkey doesn’t like at all. Turkish president Erdoğan has repeatedly stated that this Kurdish faction has close ties with the Turkish-based PKK group. The fact that the SDF are receiving heavy weapons to support the push south is something that left the Turkish government fuming. The Turkish government doesn’t want to see an established zone of influence managed by Kurds on its southern border and is there for not too happy about how things are currently developing. It was because of this the Turkish government offered to take Raqqa with the FSA-rebel groups it supports.

This proposition was declined because of several reasons. These rebel groups’ battle performance wasn’t too impressive, which became painfully clear when these units tried to take the city of al-Bab from the Islamic State. After numerous setbacks Turkish forces were sent in to stop the bleeding but even then these forces suffered some embarrassing setbacks. Several of these rebel groups’ reputation had suffered as well when it was reported they used excessive violence. The fact that the Turkish progress in northern Syria was bottle-necked by both American and Russian intervention is something that Erdoğan doesn’t like at all. He clearly saw himself playing a more prominent role in this conflict and will look for new ways to insert himself once more the moment he sees his chance.

The biggest problem is that there is a certain aspect of the Raqqa-offensive that has been downplayed to a great extent, which is the humanitarian aspect. The international coalition hasn’t made any serious attempts at providing shelter, food and security for the people who are displaced because of the ongoing violence. Local sources reported for the urgent need for a better coordinated effort at a much larger scale. The administration of the Democratic Federation of northern Syria (Rojava) has become a safe haven for hundreds of thousands of people from all over Syria who were forced to flee. Recently more refugees came from Iraq’s Nineveh province when the offensive for Mosul was launched. It takes a consistent effort to shelter, feed and provide other necessary services to help these people. When thousands more will arrive because of the fighting in and around Raqqa, the situation might soon become a crisis.

The coalition doesn’t seem to have learnt any lessons from the offensive for Mosul, despite warnings from aid organisations who tried to manage the situation. It soon became clear that the prepared camps were filled to capacity and there were more people coming every day. The fight for Mosul has been going for eight months and there’s still thousands of people trapped in hostile territory, which will only lead to an even greater humanitarian catastrophe.

If we don’t want to see the same thing happening in Rojava, the SDF need to receive international humanitarian aid in order to prepare the necessary infrastructure , resources, and logistics before the offensive on Raqqa is launched. This would mean refugee camps for several hundreds of thousands of people, drinkable water, food, medicine and other means of support. These tasks have to be performed by people who are experienced in these matters which only stresses the need for more cooperation with aid organizations.

So far it looks like the international coalition, and the US in particular, are hell-bent on taking Raqqa as soon as possible. What they seem to forget is that the fight against the Islamic State is just one aspect of the conflict that is raging in Syria and that a well-established and coordinated humanitarian presence in this part of the war-torn country can play a vital role in achieving their operational goals. It could help in decreasing the amount of refugees seeking refuge in neighbouring countries, which would relieve some of the pressure on these regional partners. It could also help to set up additional de-escalation zones and could even strengthen the political position of these groups at the negotiation table, because so far the SDF weren’t invited to the table to take part in the peace process. If the humanitarian aspect of this offensive isn’t given some serious thought and the offensive starts without the necessary preparations, the SDF risks losing international political standing since it would look like they won't be able to support all these people. It could also provide the opportunity for the Assad-coalition or Turkey to open a new front and engulf this whole part of the country back into chaos.

The offensive for Raqqa has started and there is no doubt that the city will fall eventually. What the consequences will be in the long term for the SDF and the region is something time will only tell…



= = = = = = = = 

If you have any questions, remarks or constructive feedback on the content or my writing, please do not hesitate to leave a comment. I would love to use this platform to interact with people to discuss topics like these and gain new perspectives and improve on my writing skills.

Note: this is an article that was written for a small editoral office in Brussels on a voluntary basis for the Kurdish Institute's bimonthly publication of The Kurds, issue n° 95, May-June 2017

the original Dutch version is also present on my blog)
URL: http://www.kurdishinstitute.be/de-keerzijde-van-het-raqqa-offensief-bart-rombouts/